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Internationalizing the Public Trust
Doctrine: Natural Law and
Constitutional and Statutory
Approaches to Fulfilling the Saxion
Vision
Michael C. Blumme & Rachel D. Guthrie**
The public trust doctrine, an ancient doctrine emanating from Roman
law and inheritedfrom England by the American states has been extended
in recent years beyond its traditional role in protecting public uses of
navigable waters to include new resources, like groundwater,andfor new
purposes, like preserving ecological function. But those state-law
developments, coming slowly and haphazardly, have failed to fulfill the
vision that Professor Joseph Sax sketched in his landmark articleforty
years ago. However, in the last two decades, several countries in South
Asia, Africa, and the Western Hemisphere have discovered that the public
trust doctrine is fundamental to theirjurisprudence,due to natural law or
to constitutional or statutory interpretation.In these twelve countries, the
doctrine is likely to supply environmental protection for all natural
resources, not just public access to navigable waters. This international
public trust case law also incorporates principles of precaution,
sustainable development, and intergenerationalequity; accords plaintiffs
liberalized public standing; and reflects a judicial willingness to oversee
complex remedies. These developments make the non-U.S. public trust
Copyright @ 2012 Michael C. Blumm and Rachel D. Guthrie.
Jeffrey Bain Faculty Scholar & Professor of Law, Lewis and Clark Law School.
Some of the spelling and punctuation from foreign constitutions and statutes has been
edited for clarity. This Article is dedicated to Professor Joe Sax, who has been an
inspiration in and out of the legal academy for generations of teachers, students, and
lawmakers; and to Professor Hap Dunning, whose 1980 symposium this one
commemorates, and who probably saved Mono Lake from ecological destruction.
Please direct comments to blumm@lclark.edu.
" J.D. Candidate 2012, Lewis and Clark Law School.
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case law a much better reflection of Professor Sax's vision of the doctrine
than the case law of the American states.
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INTRODUCTION

Thirty years ago, at the predecessor to this conference,' the
attendees celebrated the public trust doctrine, which Professor Sax had
exhumed, and which the California Supreme Court soon extended in
its famous Mono Lake decision of 1983.' Some contributors to that
conference saw in the public trust doctrine the seeds of a new basic
principle for environmental decision making beyond the trust
doctrine's traditional scope of tidelands and navigable waters.'
Although the scope of the public trust doctrine in the United States
has significantly expanded over the last three decades,' more
remarkable decisions have come from abroad, from what might seem
to be unlikely venues.
This Article outlines the development of the public trust doctrine in
ten diverse countries on four continents: India, Pakistan, the
Philippines, Uganda, Kenya, Nigeria, South Africa, Brazil, Ecuador,
and Canada. In these countries, the doctrine has become equated with
environmental protection and is frequently entrenched in
constitutional and statutory provisions. Even more surprising is that
the two countries with the most substantial public trust doctrine
jurisprudence - India and the Philippines - have located the
' Symposium, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law and Management,
14 UC DAVIs L. REV. 181 (1980).
2 Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective
Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REv. 471, 475 (1970); see infra Part II.
3 Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court (Mono Lake), 33 Cal. 3d 419 (1983); see
infra Part 11.
4 See, e.g., Harrison C. Dunning, The Significance of California's Public Trust
Easement for California Water Rights Law, 14 UC DAVIS L. REV. 357 (1980)
(anticipating the Mono Lake decision); Jan S. Stevens, The Public Trust: A Sovereign's
Ancient Prerogative Becomes the People's Environmental Right, UC DAVIS L. REV. 195
(1980) (writing that we grow closer to the civil law in expanding public rights to
waters); Charles F. Wilkinson, The Public Trust in Public Land Law, 14 UC DAVIS L.
REV. 269 (1980) (extending public trust doctrine principles traditionally rooted in
waters to federal public lands).
I See, e.g., In re Water Use Permit Applications (Waiahole Ditch 1), 9 P.3d 409,
445 (Haw. 2000) (reaffirming that the public trust doctrine applies to all water
resources, including groundwater); Bos. Waterfront Dev. Corp. v. Commonwealth,
393 N.E.2d 356, 363, 367 (Mass. 1979) (stating right to wharf out over tidal land does
not confer title, referring to Commercial Wharf Co. v. Windsor, 16 N.E. 560, 563 (Mass.
1888), and holding that even fee title over tidal lands is subject to public trust and
must be used for legislatively-approved public use); Raleigh Ave. Beach Ass'n v.
Atlantis Beach Club, Inc., 879 A.2d 112, 124 (NJ. 2005) (holding that upland sands
of privately owned beach must be available for public access); State v. Cent. Vt. Ry.,
Inc., 571 A.2d 1128, 1133 (Vt. 1990) (concluding that the state's fee simple grant of
littoral land to private owner did not extinguish jus publicum).
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doctrine in natural law.6 Courts, legislatures, and voters in the
countries considered in this study have expanded the public trust
doctrine significantly beyond the reach of the traditional doctrine as
established in the Mono Lake decision, and perhaps even beyond the
Saxion vision articulated over four decades ago.7 The public trust
doctrine is, in short, leading a vibrant and significant life abroad.
When Professor Sax wrote his first public trust article' - an
enterprise that now is almost reflexively referred to as "seminal"9 the public trust doctrine was hardly a coherent doctrine. But Sax
explained that the U.S. Supreme Court's nineteenth century decision
in Illinois Central Railroad v. Illinois" had been employed by courts in
Wisconsin, Massachusetts, and California to guard against the
privatization of important public resources, like parks, submerged
lands, and wetlands." For Sax, the public trust was a vehicle to ensure
the democratization of natural resources decision making." This goal
subsequently was extended into a full-fledged public property doctrine
that now provides protection to public natural resources in a manner

See infra Part III.A.La, 3.a.
See infra Part II.
* Sax's Michigan article was followed by a book, JOSEPH L. SAX, DEFENDING THE
ENVIRONMENT (1971), and an article on the Michigan Environmental Protection Act,
Joseph L. Sax & Joseph F. DiMento, Environmental Citizen Suits: Three Years'
Experience Under the Michigan Environmental ProtectionAct, 4 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1 (1974).
He also wrote a contribution to the 1980 conference, see infra note 57, and a pair of
articles on the relationship between the public trust doctrine and water rights, infra
note 62, among many other publications.
I In a Westlaw Terms and Connectors search of All Law Reviews, Texts & Bar
Journals, 105 results contained "sax" and "seminal" within the same paragraph, 92
results contained "public trust," "sax," and "seminal" within the same paragraph, and
49 results contained "public trust," "sax," "seminal," and "mich!" within the same
paragraph (searched on February 25, 2011). See, e.g., Robin Kundis Craig, A
Comparative Guide to the Western States' Public Trust Doctrines: Public Values, Private
Rights, and the Evolution Toward an Ecological Public Trust, 37 ECOLOGY L.Q. 53, 55
(2010) (hailing how Professor Sax's article revitalized the Public Trust Doctrine).
10 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
11 See Sax, supra note 2, at 491-95 (discussing parks in the context of Mount
Greylock in Massachusetts (citing Gould v. Greylock Reservation Comm'n, 215
N.E.2d 114, 117-19 (Mass. 1966)); id. at 509-10 (discussing submerged lands in
Wisconsin (citing Priewe v. Wis. State Land & Improvement Co., 67 N.W. 918 (Wis.
1896)); id. at 528-30 (discussing development of tidelands protections in California).
12 Id. at 558-61 (maintaining that administrative decision making may often be
subject to the will of a "concerted minority" to the detriment of a "diffuse majority"
when public resources are involved, such that the judiciary has room to democratize
the political process by forcing the legislature to uphold its fiduciary duties).
6
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similar to which the takings clause provides protection to private
property.' 3
It is not too strong a claim to suggest that the Mono Lake decision,
handed down three years after the 1980 conference, was inspired by
that conference.14 Mono Lake has been a leading public trust doctrine
decision ever since.15 The California Supreme Court's opinion made
several enduring contributions to public trust jurisprudence. Notably,
the court expanded the scope of the doctrine to include water rights,
explaining that no water right was vested against the public trust."
The California court also ruled that the scope of the doctrine extended
to all actions affecting navigable waters, and that the state had a
continuing supervisory duty to protect public trust resources."
Some U.S. courts, however, have been unwilling to accept the
expanded geographical scope of the doctrine," while others have gone
13 See, e.g., Richard Epstein, The Public Trust Doctrine, 7 CATO J. 411 (1987)
(providing a surprising libertarian endorsement of doctrine over concerns about rentseeking from interest groups able to capture legislatures).
'4 The Mono Lake decision cited articles from the 1980 conference no fewer than
eight times. See Mono Lake, 658 P.2d 709, 712, 720, 728 (Cal. 1983) (citing Ralph W.
Johnson, Public Trust Protectionfor Stream Flows and Lake Levels, 14 UC DAVIS L. REV.
233, 256-58 (1980)); id. at 719 & nn.15-16 (citing Stevens, supra note 8 at 197, 201);
id. at 721-22 n.18, 729 (citing Harrison C. Dunning, The Significance of California's
Public Trust Easement for California Water Rights Law, 14 UC DAVIS L. REV. 357
(1980)). The decision also cited Professor Sax's first public trust article twice. Id. at
719, n.15, 723-24 (citing Sax, supra note 2).
" For example, Westlaw's Citing References listed 94 cases that cite or mention
Mono Lake as of April 9, 2011. Arguably, the Mono Lake decision was eclipsed by the
Waiahole I decision in 2000, which extended the public trust doctrine to groundwater
and expressly incorporated the precautionary principle into the public trust doctrine;
Westlaw's Citing References lists 84 cases that cite or mention Waiahole I as of April 9,
2011, although it antedates Mono Lake by 17 years. See In re Water Use Permit
Applications (Waiahole Ditch 1), 9 P.3d 409, 445, 466-68 (Haw. 2000) (refusing to
differentiate trust based on "categories of water" and reaffirming that the public trust
applies to all waters, citing an earlier case, Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 658 P.2d 287 (Haw.
1982), which upheld the Water Commission's use of precautionary principle and
recommending its use in future decisions).
16 Mono Lake, 658 P.2d at 721.
1 Id. (declaring non-navigable tributaries to navigable streams are subject to
public trust, stating that "the dominant theme [of the public trust] is the state's
sovereign power and duty to exercise continued supervision over the trust").
1 See, e.g., Mich. Citizens for Water Conservation v. Nestle Waters, N.A., 709
N.W.2d 174, 221 (Mich. 2006) ("[W]ater, while a resource common to all Michigan
citizens, is neither owned by the state nor subject to the public trust doctrine absent a
determination that the body of water in question is navigable."); In re Town of
Nottingham, 904 A.2d 590 (N.H. 2006) (refusing to interpret the common law public
trust doctrine to apply to groundwater); R.D. Merrill v. Wash. Pollution Control
Hearings Bd., 969 P.2d 458, 467 (Wash. 1999) (stating that state statutes, not the
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beyond the scope recognized by the Mono Lake court. For example,
the Hawaii, Montana, and New Jersey Supreme Courts extended the
doctrine to all non-navigable waters, groundwater, and beaches,
respectively.19 The Hawaiian court also interpreted the public trust to
embrace the precautionary principle in order to encourage resource
protection in the absence of conclusive scientific proof. 20
However innovative the above decisions are, they have been
outpaced by developments abroad. Somewhat surprisingly, the public
trust doctrine has become internationalized and, in the process,
moved to the forefront of environmental protection in several
countries. In India, which has given the public trust doctrine the most
detailed judicial consideration of any jurisdiction outside the United
States, the doctrine has natural law origins and an extremely broad
scope." In Pakistan, the public trust is constitutionally entrenched.22
In the Philippines, the doctrine was at the center of efforts to clean up
Manila Bay.23 In Uganda, the public trust was the vehicle to prevent
public trust doctrine, provide authority to regulate groundwater and other nonnavigable waters).
19 See, e.g., Waiahole Ditch 1,9 P.3d at 445 (groundwater); Mont. Coal. for Stream
Access, Inc. v. Hildreth, 684 P.2d 1088, 1091-92 (Mont. 1984) (non-navigable
streams); Mont. Coal. for Stream Access, Inc. v. Curran, 682 P.2d 163, 171 (Mont.
1984) (all recreational, even non-navigable, streams); Raleigh Ave. Beach Ass'n v.
Atlantis Beach Club, Inc., 879 A.2d 112, 124 (NJ. 2005) (beaches).
20 See Waiahole Ditch 1, 9 P.3d at 467 (stating "at minimum, the absence of firm
scientific proof should not tie the Commission's hands in adopting reasonable
measures designed to further the public interest"). The precautionary principle states
that if an action could potentially harm the public or the environment, in the absence
of scientific consensus that the action is harmful, then the burden of proof that the
action is harmful falls on those undertaking the action. See generally ARIE
STATUS
EVOLUTION AND
TROUWBORST,
INTERNATIONAL LAw (2003) (discussing

OF

THE

PRECAUTIONARY

PRINCIPLE

IN

the international legal development and

application of the precautionary principle).
2
See infra Part III.A.1. Australia and Sri Lanka also likely have recognized the
public trust doctrine in their jurisprudence. See Hon. Brian J. Preston, Judicial
Implementation of the Principlesof Ecologically Sustainable Development in Australia and
Asia, paper presented to the Law Society of New South Wales Regional Presidents'
Meeting, Sydney, NSW, (July 21, 2006), http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.aullawlink/lec/
11lec.nsf/vwFiles/Speech_21Jul06-Preston.pdf/$file/Speech_21ulO6-Preston.pdf
(citing Willoughby City Council v. Minister Administering the Nat'l Parks and Wildlife
Act (1992) 78 LGRA (NSW) 19, 38 (Austl.), where the Land and Environment Court
of New South Wales declared that national parks are held in trust by the state, and
Bulankulama v. Sec'y Ministry of Indus. Dev., App. No. 884/99, [2000] L.K.S.C. 243,
247 (Sri Lanka) where the Court struck a proposed contract between private mineral
developer and government because the government failed to act properly as "trustee").
22 See infra Part III.A.2.
23 See infra Part IllI.A.3.
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the transformation of the Butamira Forest Reserve into a sugar
24
a remedy for the
plantation. In Kenya, the doctrine provided
discharge of raw sewage into the Kiserian River,25 while in Nigeria the
public trust has yet to be the subject of case law.26 In South Africa, the
doctrine is of constitutional dimension and at the center of the
country's statutes concerning environmental, water resources,
minerals, and coastal zone management.2 ' Brazil also has a wealth of
constitutional provisions embracing the public trust, while in
Ecuador, the voters passed a constitutional initiative that entrenched
the public trust doctrine into that country's basic governing
document." Finally, in Canada, the public trust supported the federal
government's claim to damages from a forest fire - allegedly due to a
licensee's negligence - and allowed a suit against the federal
government for failing to maintain a common right to fish in Atlantic
waters.
This Article explores the internationalization of the public trust
doctrine. Part I explains Professor Sax's vision of the public trust
doctrine. Part II discusses the Mono Lake decision and its
contributions to the doctrine. Part III examines the adoption and
development of the public trust doctrine in twelve countries across
four continents. The discussion begins in Southeast Asia with an
assessment of the natural law-based Indian public trust doctrine that
has substantially affected its natural resources decision making. The
analysis then turns to Pakistan, where the Supreme Court has used
original jurisdiction to interpret the public trust doctrine to protect
coastal land from waste disposal, a residential area from an electric
facility, and a township from mining that threatened water supplies.
The next section considers the Philippines, whose natural law origin
of the public trust doctrine has been endorsed not only by its Supreme
Court but also by other branches of government and is now embedded
in the Filipino Constitution.
The Article proceeds to analyze the public trust doctrine in Africa,
first considering the Ugandan public trust doctrine, which has both
constitutional and statutory bases. An investigation of the Nigeria
public trust doctrine follows, where the doctrine is implicit in the
24

See infra Part III.B.1,

n See infra Part 111.B.2.
26
27

See infra Parts 1II.B.2 (Kenya), 1Il.C.3 (Nigeria).
See infra Part I1I.C.4.

See infra Part Il.D.1.
29 See infra Part I1I.D.2 (Ecuador).
2

30

See infra Part 1I.D.3.
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constitutional right to life. The discussion then turns to the public
trust doctrine in Kenya, which has been incorporated into several
provisions of the 2010 constitution, and to South Africa, which has
embedded the public trust doctrine in that country's constitution and
environmental statutes.
The study then moves to consider South and North America,
looking first at Brazil, which has no judicial interpretation of the
public trust doctrine but has public trust principles throughout its
constitution. The ensuing section examines the initiative that led to
the establishment of the Ecuador public trust doctrine. The final
section turns to Canada and suggests that, despite its adherence to
parliamentary supremacy, that country has considerable potential to
adopt a viable public trust doctrine. The Article concludes that the
rapid embracing of the public trust doctrine in these diverse countries
evidences an evolution of the doctrine towards becoming a general
principle of international law - a development perhaps beyond what
Professor Sax envisioned in his pioneering article four decades ago.31
1.

PROFESSOR SAX'S VISION OF THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE

When Professor Sax penned his influential article in 1970, the
public trust doctrine was a fragmented collection of case law. In the
best academic tradition, Sax collected those decisions, 32 rationalized
them, and explained how they fit with the U.S. Supreme Court's rather
mysterious decision in Illinois Central Railroad v. Illinois. In that case,
Justice Field, for a 4-3 Court, invalidated the state legislature's express
grant to the railroad of most of Chicago Harbor lakebed.14 For Sax,
31 See Sax, supra note 2, at 556-57 (suggesting that the public trust doctrine could
be applied to "controversies involving air pollution, the dissemination of pesticides,
the location of rights-of-way, and strip mining or wetland filling on private lands in a
state where governmental permits are required").
32 Sax traced the origins of the doctrine to Roman and English law. Id. at 475-76.
3 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
" Id. at 452-53 (ruling that the public trust doctrine prevented the state
legislature from granting over to a railroad - over the governor's veto and under
suspicious circumstances - most of the lakebed of Chicago Harbor). Justice Shiras,
writing for a three-member dissent, thought that the state had not violated the
doctrine because it retained regulatory and revenue rights. See generally Joseph D.
Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Origins of the American Public Trust Doctrine: What
Really Happened in Illinois Central, 71 U. CHI. L. REv. 799 (2004) (providing a
comprehensive review of the details of the railroad grant and the Court's decision and
concluding that corruption probably explains the grant, but noting that downstate
interests supported it because it promised to share revenues outside the city of
Chicago).
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who thought the public trust doctrine could be a "useful tool of
general application for citizens seeking to develop a comprehensive
legal approach to resource management problems,"3 Illinois Central
was the public trust's lodestar, a case that introduced a needed judicial
skepticism in reviewing government giveaways of public resources.36
However, Sax was clear that the doctrine did not prohibit all
privatization of public resources; it was not "a niggling preservation of
every inch of public trust property against any change, nor a precise
maintenance of every historical pattern of use."" Instead, the public
trust prevented only substantial losses of public resources.38
Sax proceeded to show how the legacy of Illinois Central had
affected judicial decision making in Massachusetts, Wisconsin, and
California.3 9 Massachusetts's Supreme Judicial Court rejected a ski
resort for Mount Greylock, a state park,' because a state agency's
authorization of a commercial resort on public lands conflicted with a
judicial presumption that the state would not ordinarily privatize
public resources without a clear statutory directive to do so." Sax
considered this result, requiring clear legislative authorization for the
privatization of public resources, to foster democratization of decision

3
Sax, supra note 2, at 474. To fulfill this role, Sax maintained that the doctrine
had to meet three criteria: (1) it had to contain a legal right in the public; (2) it had to
be enforceable against the government (he did not specify which government); and
(3) it had to advance contemporary environmental quality concerns. Id.
36 Id. at 489-91. Sax raised the issue of whether the courts, through the public
trust doctrine, could restrain the excesses of the democratic process through this
judicial skepticism of public resource giveaways. Id. at 491. He responded that courts
can play a useful role in elevating low visibility decision-making by demanding
explicit authorizing legislation and encouraging public awareness and participation in
the administrative process by imposing proof burdens on agencies allocating trust
resources. Id. at 497-99, 502, 508, 514, 558-61. A related point was that the trust
doctrine could encourage greater democratization of decision-making by prohibiting
the delegation to local entities of trust issues that are of statewide significance. Id. at
528, 531-34.
37
Id. at 488.
3
See, e.g., Ill. Cent. R.R., 146 U.S. at 452 (ruling that the state could grant some
portions of the jus publicum, so long as the grant does not "substantially impair" the
public interest in remaining portions).
3
Id. at 491-546.
' Mount Greylock is the highest summit of the Berkshire Mountains, which
surround Williams College, the senior author's alma mater.
41 Sax, supra note 2, at 494-96.
Sax went on to describe several ensuing
Massachusetts cases that employed the Greylock reasoning to prevent filling of a great
pond for a highway project and acquiring wetlands for another highway project. See
id. at 499-502.
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making by ensuring that public resources would not be lost in low
visibility administrative decisions.4 2
Sax's study of Wisconsin cases produced similar conclusions: the
public trust doctrine required explicit legislative directives to ensure
that the public is informed when public resources are conveyed to
private hands or more restrictive uses. Proponents of such uses must
bear the burden of demonstrating the consequent public benefits, and
traditional notions of judicial deference to legislative choices and
administrative discretion are not applicable.' Thus, the public trust
doctrine was, according to Sax, "an ensurer of the efficacy of the
democratic process."
Sax's study of California cases led to different conclusions, as that
state had conveyed much of its shorelands to private individuals and
municipalities.4 6 Concerning the former, Sax criticized the lower court
decision in Marks v. Whitney, which ruled that the owner of a private
tideland could fill the land because the owner had an unrestricted,
vested title. Sax argued that protecting the public interest in trust
resources like tidelands required an open and visible public
determination. 8 He anticipated the California Supreme Court's
ensuing decision in the case, which reversed the lower court and held
that the private landowner had no right to destroy the tidelands,
drawing a sharp conceptual severance in the property rights of trust
land held by private grantees.49 According to the California Supreme
Court, the landowner held only the jus privatum, which was cabined
by the state's jus publicum in the tidelands." As for municipal
grantees,5 Sax argued that California case law and statutes restricted
Id. at 498-99.
See, e.g., id. at 514 (requiring "an open and explicit legislative decision").
" Id. ("[WIhen the public interest of a project is unclear, its proponents will have
the burden of justifying the project and will not be allowed to rely on traditional
presumptions of legislative propriety or administrative discretion.").
45 Id. at 523.
46 Id. at 524.
4
Id. at 530-31 (discussing Marks v. Whitney, 80 Cal. Rptr. 606 (Ct. App.
1969)(enjoining the filling of a trust tideland by a private landowner)).
48 Id.
" Compare id., with Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374, 381 (Cal. 1971).
5o Marks, 491 P.2d at 380, 381; see Michael C. Blumm, The
Public Trust Doctrine
and Private Property: The Accommodation Principle, 27 PACE ENVTL. L. REv. 649, 658-59
(2010) [hereinafter Accommodation Principle] (discussing the court's division of
tidelands' title into two conceptually distinct estates).
" Sax, supra note 2, at 534 (discussing the tragedy of the commons in which there
is a "disjunction between the perceived benefit to the local entity and the total impact
of such local choices on the community of users as a whole").
42
4
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municipal discretion and required that trust resources remain
available for public use, analogizing the localism of municipalities to
the profit motive of private landowners.5 2 Similarly, both the state
legislature and state agencies had an obligation to maintain public uses
of trust resources, and courts would view commercial or private-use
projects with skepticism.13
Sax acknowledged that not all states had recognized the judicial
skepticism he observed in his principal case studies, but he thought
that the public trust doctrine had considerable potential to expand
beyond the traditional cases, which had concentrated on submerged
lands and, to a lesser extent, parklands. Sax specifically mentioned air
pollution, pesticide use, utility rights-of-way, strip mining, and
wetland fills on private lands as promising areas for public trust
doctrine growth.55 He encouraged courts to see the public trust
doctrine as a useful vehicle of judicial oversight to promote
democratization of legislative or administrative decision making when
(1) diffuse public uses are threatened with resource alienation at
below market value, (2) the government invests private interests with
the power to make resource decisions, or (3) the government proposes
to reallocate public uses to private uses. 6 Sax was certainly prescient
in predicting growth of the public trust doctrine.
At the predecessor to this conference in 1980, Professor Sax
revisited the public trust doctrine a decade after his influential 1970
article. Sax argued that the doctrine should be "liberated from its
historical shackles" because it was "unreasonable to view the public
trust as simply a problem of alienation of publicly owned property
into private hands[," since most of the threat to public resources
52 Id. at 538 (discussing a nominal restriction of trust property to water-related
activities, but deciding that the restriction was better interpreted as part of a larger
requirement of maintaining public use of trust resources); see also id. at 542.
" Id. at 543-44. However, Sax thought that there was no principle of California
law that would prevent the legislature from subordinating traditional public uses to
offshore oil and gas development, although he did suggest that the trust doctrine
would require adequate inquiry into safeguards to protect other public uses and use of
the state revenues from oil and gas leasing to be devoted to uses of statewide interest.
Id. at 545-46.
5
Id. at 551-55 (discussing Rogers v. City of Mobile, 169 So. 2d 222 (Ala. 1964),
and Tex. Oyster Growers Ass'n v. Odom, 385 S.W.2d 899 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965)).
1
Id. at 557 ("[C]ertainly the principle of the public trust is broader than its
traditional application indicates."). Sax even posited that the public trust doctrine
could apply beyond the natural resources field, mentioning "issues affecting the poor
and consumer groups" as other examples of "problems of equality in the political and
administrative process . . ." Id.
56 Id. at 561-63.

754

University of California,Davis

[Vol. 45:741

came not from privatization but from poor public decision making.
Sax now identified the trust doctrine as a public property concept that
guarded against destabilizing changes that frustrate reasonable public
expectations." Under this view, the doctrine did not protect against all
change, but instead was a commitment to evolutionary, not
revolutionary change. 59 For example, Sax explained City of Berkeley v.
Superior Court of Alameda County, where the California Supreme Court
upheld a denial of fills proposed by the landowner because the public
trust doctrine still burdened tidelands after they were privatized, as
judicial protection of longstanding public uses of tidelands. 6 0 Thus, in
addition to encouraging democratization of decision making, the
public trust doctrine equipped courts with the ability to balance
proposed developments based on record title against longstanding
public uses grounded on reasonable public expectations."
In 1990, nearly a decade after Sax's second public trust article,62
Carol Rose assessed Sax's contributions to the public trust doctrine
through a pair of articles Sax wrote on the takings clause.6' Rose
" Joseph L. Sax, Liberating the Public Trust Doctrinefrom Its Historical Shackles, 14
UC DAVIS L. REv. 185, 186 (1980).
58 Id. at 188 ("[T]he central idea of the public trust is preventing the destabilizing
disappointment of expectations held in common but without formal recognition such
as title.").
" Id. (identifying "the protection of stable relationships" as "one of the most basic
and persistent concerns of the legal system"). Sax gave a brief history of common
lands in medieval Europe to support his claim of largely protecting customary public
uses even in the absence of formal public land title. Id. at 189-92.
60 Id. at 192 (discussing City of Berkeley v. Superior Court, 606 P.2d 362 (Cal.
1980) (recognizing public standing to enforce the jus publicum in the tidelands to
which the landowner owned in fee and describing the public trust doctrine as a
flexible doctrine capable of adjusting to accommodate changing public needs). Sax
also mentioned the Mono Lake case, then in the lower courts. Id.
61

Id. at 194 (". . . mere unutilized title, however ancient, does not generated the

sort of expectations central to the justness of property claims, and . . . long-standing
public uses have an important place in the analysis."). The City of Berkeley decision
was the subject of a casenote in the 1980 symposium, Craig Labadie, Note, Increased
Public Trust Protectionfor California'sTidelands - City of Berkeley v. Superior Court,
14 UC DAVIs L. REV. 399 (1980).
62 Sax also evaluated the public trust's effect on Western water rights in the wake
of the Mono Lake decision in a pair of articles. See Joseph L. Sax, The Constitution,
Property Rights and the Future of Water Law, 61 U. COLO. L. REV. 257, 260-67 (1990)
(discussing how constitutional law may address the perceived need for protection of
instream flows in the context of prior appropriation scheme); Joseph L. Sax, The
Limits of Private Rights in Public Waters, 19 ENvTL. L. 473, 479-82 (1989) (maintaining
that private rights in water have always been subordinate to public rights, dating back
to the mill dams of the Industrial Revolution).
63 Carol M. Rose, Joseph Sax and the Idea of the Public Trust, 25 ECOLoGY L.Q. 351,
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traced Sax's public trust thinking to a pair of articles he wrote on the
takings clause. The first article was premised on distinguishing
between government regulation settling disputes between landowners
(no taking) and government acting in an enterprise capacity, pursuing
its own projects (more likely to be a taking).' The second article
reflected Sax's growing skepticism about the capability of majority rule
to successfully handle environmental problems, perhaps a reflection of
the contemporaneous ascension of "public choice" political theory and
the "capture" theory of administrative decision making.6 5 Rose
proceeded to consider various manifestations of the public trust
doctrine,66 but she emphasized the property characteristics of the
doctrine, the most telling of which was its relationship to riparian
water rights. Riparianism's inherent balancing and allowance of small
privatizations of public rights, in fact, fits quite nicely with the public
trust doctrine's overriding accommodation principle.66 That principle
would be the basis of one of the leading decisions of public trust law
of the late twentieth century - a case that signaled the movement of
the doctrine beyond its traditional navigation moorings to mediate
between rights to divert water from streams and instream claims.

352-53 (1998).
64 Id. at 352-53 (discussing Joseph L. Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE
L.J. 36 (1964)). Rose thought the dichotomy resembled the nuisance-prevention
versus public-good providing distinction, which "always had a residuum of commonsense appeal." Id. at 353.
65 Id. at 353-54 (discussing Joseph L. Sax, Takings, Private Property and Public
Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149 (1971), and citing JAMES BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE
CALCULUS OF CONSENT (1965), PHILLIP 0. Foss, THE POLITICS OF GRAss (1960), MANCUR
OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1965), and Daniel A. Farber, Positive Theory
as a Normative Critique, 68 So. CAL. L. REV. 1565 (1995)); see also Michael C. Blumm,

Public Choice Theory and the Public Lands: Why Multiple Use Failed, 18 HARV. ENVTL. L.
REV. 405, 415-22 (1994) (applying public choice theory to public land decision
making).
66 Rose, supra note 63, at 355-59 (discussing the public trust's iterations as the
"hard look" doctrine and as a public property right); see also Michael C. Blumm,
Public Property and the Democratization of Western Water Law: A Modern View of the
Public Trust Doctrine, 19 ENVTL. L. 573, 580-94, 597-604 (1989) (discussing the public
trust doctrine as a rule of construction and a defense to takings claims as well as its
"hard look" and public property manifestations, predicting the growth of the doctrine
as part of state constitutional interpretation, and responding to Professor Lazarus and
Professor Huffman, critics of the public trust doctrine).
67 Rose, supra note 63, at 360-62 (crediting Sax's scholarship).
68 See Blumm, Accommodation Principle, supra note 50.
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THE PIONEERING MONO LAKE DECISION

In 1983, three years after the predecessor of this symposium, the
California Supreme Court decided the famous Mono Lake case.69 The
court ruled that California's public trust doctrine protected the state's
system of water rights.70 Thus, the state water board's 1940 issuance of
water rights to the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power to
divert water from the Mono Lake Basin without evaluating the effects
of the diversions on public trust resources created no vested rights
against the public trust.7 Consequently, the court concluded that the
state had to reconsider the effects of the diversions on the Mono Basin
ecosystem. 72 That reconsideration, which was also required by
ancillary litigation in which the California Court of Appeal ruled that
the state Fish and Game Code required post-1953 water diversions to
be conditioned to protect existing fish life, 3 produced a 1994 water
board decision that established interim measures for lake and stream
restoration. An ensuring final plan in 1998 set flow regimes for the
lake's feeder streams; established a lake-level goal, and monitoring
regimes for water flows, waterfowl, and habitat; and promised an
adaptive management program.75 By 2010, this program raised Mono

6'9 Mono Lake, 658 P.2d 709, 728 (Cal. 1983).
70 The lower court had issued summary judgment in favor of the Los Angeles
Department of Water and Power, ruling that the public trust doctrine was "subsumed
in the water rights system of the state." Id. at 718 (quoting the trial court). See
generally Michael C. Blumm & Thea Schwatz, Mono Lake and the Evolving Public Trust
in Western Water, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 701 (1995) (discussing the case and its progeny).
n Mono Lake, 658 P.2d at 728 ("The state accordingly has the power to reconsider
allocation decision even though those decisions were made after due consideration of
the effect on the public trust. The case for reconsidering a particular decision,
however, is even stronger when that decision failed to weigh and consider public trust
uses. In the case before us, the salient fact is that no responsible body has ever
determined the impact of diverting the entire flow of the Mono Lake tributaries into
the Los Angeles Aqueduct . . ").
72 Id. at 729 ("It is clear that some responsible body ought to reconsider the
allocation of the waters of the Mono Lake Basin. No vested rights bar such
reconsideration.").
" Cal. Trout v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 255 Cal. Rptr. 184, 599-604 (1989)
(interpreting sections 5937 and 5946 of the California Fish and Game Code).
" Cal. State Water Res. Ctrl. Bd., Mono Lake Basin Water Right Decision 1631 (Sept.
28, 1994) [hereinafter Decision 1631], available at http://www.monobasinresearch.orgl
images/legal/d1631text.htm.
" The orders of the state water board, along with a number of other legal
documents are collected by the Mono Basin Clearinghouse, available at
http://www.monobasinresearch.org/timelines/polchr.htm.
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Lake's water level roughly ten feet from the low of the early 1980s,
about halfway to the restoration goal. 6
The Mono Lake decision began the modern era of public trust law as
envisioned by Professor Sax. The opinion expanded the scope of the
doctrine beyond submerged lands to water rights administration, and
beyond navigable waters to all tributaries affecting navigable waters."
Although the extension of the public trust to water rights has
generated a mountain of legal commentary, enlarging the geographic
scope of the doctrine beyond navigable waters was arguably Mono
Lake's larger legacy. Several states have expanded their public trust
doctrines beyond traditionally navigable waters since 1983," but only
The pre-diversion Mono Lake had an elevation in excess of 6,417 feet above sea
level in most years until 1947, when the lake level began a steady decline until it
reached 6,372 feet in the early 1980s, a decline of some 45 feet in elevation. In
October 2010, the lake level was 6,381.6 feet, about 9.5 feet below the target. See
MONO LAKE COMMITTEE, Mono Lake Levels 1850-Present (Oct. 10, 2010),
(providing annual Mono
http://www.monobasinresearch.org/data/levelyearly.htm
Lake levels, dating back to 1850).
" Mono Lake, the second largest lake in California, is navigable water under state
law. City of Los Angeles v. Aitken, 52 P.2d 585, 588 (Cal. Ct. App. 1935). The
tributary streams feeding Mono Lake are Mill, Lee Vining, Walker, Parker, and Rush
Creeks. See Decision 1631, supra note 74.
78 See, e.g., DAVID C. SLADE, THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE IN MOTION: THE
EVOLUTION OF THE DOCTRINE 1997-2008 (2008) (reviewing the 284 state and federal
cases involving the Public Trust Doctrine from 1997 to the present); Blumm &
Schwartz, supra note 70 (reviewing the history, posture, and legacy of the Mono Lake
decision); Carol Necole Brown, Drinking from a Deep Well: The Public Trust Doctrine
and Western Water Law, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1 (2006) (advocating for a more liberal
interpretation of the Public Trust Doctrine); Charles F. Wilkinson, The Headwaters of
the Public Trust: Some of the TraditionalDoctrine, 19 ENvTL. L. 425 (1989) (tracing the
origins and legitimacy of the Public Trust Doctrine); Alexandra B. Klass & Ling-Yee
Huang, Restoring the Trust: Water Resources and the Public Trust Doctrine,A Manual for
Advocates (Ctr. for Progressive Reform, White Paper No. 908, 2009), available at
http://www.progressivereform.org/articles/CPR_- Public Trust DoctrineManual.pdf
(priming advocates and interest groups on how to use the Public Trust Doctrine to
protect surface and groundwater resources).
7
See, e.g., Ark. River Rights Comm. v. Echubby Lake Hunting Club, 126 S.W.3d
738 (Ark. Ct. App. 2003) (noting navigable waters may change with construction of
improvements, like locks and dams); Waiahole Ditch 1, 9 P.3d 409 (Haw. 2000)
(groundwater); Fencl v. Harpers Ferry, 620 N.W.2d 808, 813 (Iowa 2001) (recreation
waters); Mont. Coal. for Stream Access v. Curran, 682 P.2d 163, 171 (Mont. 1984) (all
recreational streams); Fish House v. Clarke, 693 S.E.2d 208, 212 (N.C. Ct. App. 2010)
(privately-owned, man-made canals); Raleigh Ave. Beach Ass'n v. Atlantis Beach Club,
Inc., 879 A.2d 112, 124 (NJ. 2005) (private beaches); Parks v. Cooper, 676 N.W.2d
823, 838-39 (S.D. 2004) (all waters in state); State v. Cent. Vt. Ry., 571 A.2d 1128 (Vt.
1989) (private shorelands). See generally Mackenzie Keith, Judicial Protection for
Beaches and Parks: The Public Trust Doctrine Above the High Water Mark, 14 HASTINGS
W.-Nw. J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 165 (2009) (collecting cases).
76
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the Hawaiian Supreme Court expressly subjected water rights to the
doctrine.8"
Beyond Mono Lake's expanded scope of the public trust doctrine, the
decision's legacy includes the court's declaration that no vested private
rights impede the application of the public trust." Thus, the doctrine
limits the development rights of private landowners."' However, those
rights are not disregarded, as the court made clear that the public trust
doctrine required a balancing between public and private rights, and
that the former was to be accommodated only so far as feasible." This
"feasible accommodation" principle may be the Mono Lake decision's
chief contribution to the public trust doctrine," a proposition
Professor Sax endorsed in his first public trust doctrine article."
A related legacy of Mono Lake concerns the court's imposition of a
"continuous supervisory duty" on the part of the state to consider the
public trust doctrine in the planning and allocation of trust
resources. 6 In carrying out this duty, the state was not confined by
past erroneous decisions," even if it had considered the public trust in
an earlier allocation decision.8 8 Instead, the state was to continuously
" Waiahole Ditch 1,9 P.3d at 443-44.
Mono Lake, 658 P.2d 709, 729, 732 (Cal. 1983) (the public trust doctrine
8
"precludes anyone from acquiring a right to harm the public trust"). Thus, the water
rights at issue in the case were effectively usufructuary licenses. Id. at 724, 727.
82 This point was evident a dozen years before the Mono Lake decision in Marks v.
Whitney, 491 P.2d 374, 381 (Cal. 1971) (noting that owner ofjus privatum may not fill
and develop property subject to public trust). And, it actually was laid down by the
California Supreme Court as early as 1884 in People v. Gold Run Co., 4 P. 1152, 1159
(Cal. 1884) (enjoining gold mining operations that impaired navigation and polluting
American and Sacramento Rivers, the beds of which, the court ruled, are owned by the
state in trust for the people, and that state cannot relinquish "the rights of the people
to the use of the navigable waters flowing over [them]"). See also People v. Cal. Fish
Co., 138 P. 79, 88 (Cal. 1913) (finding that state tidelands grantees had title subject to
a public easement for trust purposes of navigation and commerce "and to the right of
the state, as administrator and controller of these public uses and the public trust
therefor[e], to enter upon and possess the same for the preservation and advancement
of the public uses . . .").
83 Mono Lake, 658 P.2d at 728. The court specifically anticipated that the doctrine
could authorize trans-basin water diversions that harmed public trust uses "[als a
matter of current and historical necessity." Id. at 727.
84 See Blumm, Accommodation Principle,supra note 50, at 665-66.
85 Sax, supra note 2, at 486-88, 509-11, 514-15, 539.
86 Mono Lake, 658 P.2d at 728, 732 (noting that the public trust doctrine "imposes
a continuing duty on the state to take such uses into account in allocating water
resources").
87 Id. at 728 ("(Tlhe state is not confined by past allocation decisions which may
be incorrect in light of current knowledge or inconsistent with current needs.").
I See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
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seek to preserve trust assets subject, of course, to the feasible
accommodation principle.89 Finally, although the decision did not
originate these ideas, it reinforced the propositions that the public
trust was: (1) enforceable by the public, 90 and (2) an evolving concept,
consonant with changing public values.9 1
In sum, the Mono Lake decision was truly a remarkable one. It not
only rescued the lake from what seemed to be ecological destruction,9 2
but it also initiated the modern era of the American public trust
doctrine, extending the doctrine consistent with - and perhaps
beyond - Professor Sax's vision. 93 Some American decisions have
eclipsed the innovations of Mono Lake, extending the doctrine to
beaches and groundwater, for example, and including within it the
precautionary principle." But, by far the biggest advances since Mono
Lake have occurred outside the United States. The following sections
explain some of the most significant of these developments.

8 Mono Lake, 658 P.2d at 728 ("[PIreserve, so far as consistent with the public
interest, the uses protected by the trust."); id. ("protect public trust uses whenever
feasible.").
" Id. at 716 n.1. Public standing under the public trust doctrine was expressly
recognized by the California Supreme Court in Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374, 38182 (Cal. 1971) (involving an adjacent landowner). In California, public standing to
enforce the doctrine seems irrespective of any statutory grant of standing to challenge
an administrative decision, which is not the case in some other states. See Meredith
Armstrong, Citizen Standing and the Public Trust Doctrine: An Untold Story (2010)
(unpublished comment) (on file with author). Other states deny members of the
public standing by importing the "special injury" rule of public nuisance law
(requiring injury "different in kind" than suffered by the general public). See id.
" Mono Lake, 658 P.2d at 719, quoting from Marks, 491 P.2d at 259-60
(discussing importance of preserving tidelands "in their natural state, so that they may
serve as ecological units for scientific study, as open space, and as environments
which provide food and habitat for birds and marine life, and which favorably affect
the scenery and climate of the area.").
92 See MONO LAKE COMMITTEE, supra note 76 and accompanying text.
93 For example, Mono Lake's continuous supervisory duty, the feasible
accommodation doctrine, and its disclaimer of vested rights were at least more specific
than Professor Sax's prescriptions, although they may have been applications of the
principles he articulated. See supra note 86 (supervision); note 83 (feasibility); note 81
(rights), and accompanying text.
9 See Waiahole Ditch 1,9 P.3d 409, 467 (Haw. 2000) (adopting the precautionary
principle, which authorizes measures to protect trust resources in absence of
conclusive scientific proof); id. at 443-44 (beaches and groundwater). For an
argument that the doctrine can protect the atmosphere against excessive greenhouse
gas emissions, see generally Mary C. Wood, Atmospheric Trust and Fiduciary Duty, in
FIDUCIARY DUTY AND THE ATMOSPHERIC COMMONS (Ken Coghill ed., 2010), and Mary C.
Wood, Atmospheric Trust Litigation, in CLIMATE CHANGE READER (Wm. H. Rodgers &
M. Robinson-Dorn eds., 2010).
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THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE

A. The Public Trust Doctrine in Southeast Asia and the Pacific
1. India: Natural Law Origins and Constitutional Entrenchment
The public trust doctrine has had its most persistent and profound
effect in India, where the Indian Supreme Court has fully embraced
the doctrine over a substantial period of time. In fact, the public trust
is now much more fundamental to Indian jurisprudence than it is in
the United States. 95
a.

Origins and Basis

The Indian public trust doctrine originated in the Supreme Court of
India's 1997 decision in M.C. Mehta v. Kamal Nath, which involved
Span Resort's proposal to dredge, blast, and reconstruct the riverbed of
the Beas River to redirect the river to avoid flooding that threatened its
resort. 96 The resort had a ninety-nine year lease of government land in
a protected forest to build a motel and ancillary facilities along the
river, as well as approval of the redirection project from the Minister
of the Environment and the local government.97 M.C. Mehta, an
activist lawyer, sued the Minister,98 alleging that the project required
9
For example, in the United States the public trust doctrine apparently does not
apply to the federal government, although there are suggestions that it should; see also
Crystal Chase, The Illinois Central Public Trust Doctrine and Federal Common Law: An
Unconventional View, 16 HASTINGS W.-Nw. J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 113, 137-43 (2010)
(interpreting the landmark Illinois Central case to be a product of federal, not state,
law); see generally Mary Turnipseed et al., The Silver Anniversary of the United States
Exclusive Economic Zone: Twenty-Five Years of Ocean Use and Abuse, and the Possibility
of a Blue Water Public Trust Doctrine, 36 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1 (2009) (suggesting that the
doctrine should apply to ocean management); Wilkinson, supra note 4 (arguing that
the doctrine should apply to federal public land law).
96 M.C. Mehta v. Kamal Nath, (1997) 1 S.C.C. 388 (1996) (India), in I UNITED

NATIONS ENVIRONMENT PROJECT COMPENDIUM OF JUDICIAL DECISIONS IN MATTERS
RELATED TO THE ENVIRONMENT, NATIONAL DECISIONS 259 (1998) [hereinafter UN
COMPENDIUM], availableat http://unep.org/padelia/publicationsfJud.Dec.Nat.pre.pdf.
9
See id. at 3 (describing the 99-year lease to resort); id. at 6 (discussing federal
and local approval of the redirection project).
" Professor Sairam Bhat indicated that it is not unusual for the Indian Supreme
Court to encourage litigants to take up issues of interest to the Court, which seems to
be what happened in this case. Interview by Rachel Guthrie with Sairam Bhat,
Professor, National Law School of India at Bangalore, in Portland, Or. (Oct. 21, 2010)
[hereinafter Interview with Professor Bhat]. The Court indicated twice that it was
taking judicial notice of a February 25, 1996 article that appeared in the Indian
Express, which discussed the timber sale issue. M.C. Mehta, in UN COMPENDIUM, supra
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major excavation of public land, encroached on a protected forest, and
threatened neighbors with landslides and flooding."
The Indian Supreme Court ruled that the lease violated the public
trust doctrine. The court said the doctrine was part of Indian law
because Indian jurisprudence was inherited from English common
law, and which prevented the "aesthetic use and the pristine glory of
the natural resources, the environment, and the ecosystems of our
country . . . [from being] eroded for private, commercial or any other
use unless the courts find it necessary, in good faith, for the public
good and in the public interest to encroach upon the said
resources."co In a sweeping opinion, the court also adopted wholesale
the entirety of American public trust jurisprudence, citing both the
Illinois Central Railroad decision and Professor Sax's article, and
ultimately declaring the public trust doctrine to be "the law of the
land." 01 Moreover, the court inferred that the basis of the trust
doctrine lay in natural law, opining that the "laws of nature ...

are

imposed on us by the natural world" and must "inform all of our
social institutions. "102
note 96, at 261, 264. There is no mention of a lower court decision in the Supreme
Court's opinion. On the role of public interest litigation in protecting environmental
human rights, see

generally JONA RAZZAQUE,

PUBLIC INTEREST ENVIRONMENTAL

(2004). For surveys of the Indian
public trust doctrine cases, see David Takacs, The Public Trust Doctrine, Environ.
Human Rights, and the Future of Private Property, 16 N.Y.U. ENvTL. L.J. 711, 735-40
(2008), and James L. Wescoat, Jr., Submerged Landscape: The Public Trust in Urban
Environmental Design, From Chicago to Karachi and Back Again, 10 VT. J. ENvTL. L 435,
465-69 (2009).
" M.C. Mehta, in UN COMPENDIUM, supra note 96, at 268. The forest was stateowned. See id.
LITIGATION IN INDIA, PAKISTAN, AND BANGLADESH

100

Id. at 273.

101Id. at 269, 270. Reminiscent of the language employed by the Mono Lake court,
the Indian Supreme Court described the case as a "classic struggle between those
members of the public who would preserve our rivers, forests, and parks and open
lands in their pristine purity and those charged with administrative responsibilities
who, under the pressures of the changing needs of an increasingly complex society,
find it necessary to encroach to some extent upon open lands heretofore considered
inviolate to change." Id. at 272; cf. Mono Lake (Cal. 1983) (describing the meeting of
appropriation system of water law and the public trust doctrine "in a unique and
dramatic setting which highlights the clash of values"). On the precedential value of
U.S. case law in Indian courts, see Rajeev Dhavan, Borrowed Ideas: On the Impact of
American Scholarship on Indian Law, 33 AM. J. COMP. LAw 505, 513-16 (1985), Adam
M. Smith, Making Itself At Home: UnderstandingForeign Law in DomesticJurisprudence:
The Indian Case, 24 BERKELEYJ. INT'L L. 218, 239 (2006).
102 M.C. Mehta, in UN COMPENDIUM, supra note 96, at 269 (relying on David B.
Hunter, An Ecological Perspective on Property: A Call for Judicial Protection, 12 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REV. 311 (1988)).

762

University of California,Davis

[Vol. 45:741

Three years later, the Indian Supreme Court located the public trust
doctrine in the Indian Constitution. In M.I. Builders Private Ltd. v.
Radhey Shayam Sahu, the court invoked the doctrine in enjoining the
construction of an underground shopping complex within a public
park that a local development authority approved.' 3 The court further
ordered restoration of the park by the builder.'" The court agreed
with a state high court that the public trust doctrine protected the
park because of its "historical importance and environmental
necessity" and was entrenched in Article 21 of the Constitution, which
declares that "[nio person shall be deprived of his life or personal
liberty except according to procedure established by law."' 05 Thus,
over a decade ago, the Indian Supreme Court found that the public
trust doctrine was part of fundamental Indian jurisprudence due to its
inherited English common law tradition, natural law, and the Indian
constitution's right to life.
In 2009, the Indian Supreme Court made clear that although the
trust doctrine was constitutionally required, its common law and
natural law origins have not been superseded:
The Indian society has, since time immemorial, been
conscious of the necessity of protecting the environment and
ecology. The main moto [sic] of social life has been "to live in
harmony with nature." [The] preachings [of sages and saints
of India] . . . are ample evidence of the society's respect for

plants, trees, earth, sky, air, water and every form of life. It
103M.I. Builders Private Ltd. v. Radhey Shyam Sahu, (1999) 6 S.C.C. 464, 466
(India), available at http://www.indiankanoon.org/doc/1937304/.
" The court's restoration directive reflected the fact that the public trust doctrine
in India burdens not only government agencies but private parties as well. Id. at 530.
105 Id. at 466 (interpreting article 21 of the Indian Constitution). Citing Professor
Sax, the court noted that "a court will look with considerable skepticism upon any
governmental conduct which is calculated either to reallocate [a resource available for
free public use] to more restricted uses or to subject public uses to the self-interest of
private parties." Id. at 518.
A year before the M.I. Builders decision, the High Court of Jammu and Kashmir
declared that the public trust doctrine "is now considered as part and parcel of Article
21 of the Constitution of India." Th. Majra Singh v. Indian Oil Corp., 1999 A.I.R. 81
(India), available at
O.K.) 82, para. 6 (Jammu & Kashmir H.C.)
http://indiankanoon.org/doc/201603/. Earlier, the High Court of Kerala interpreted
Article 21 to include the right to a healthy environment, stating: "The right to life is
much more than the right to animal existence and its attributes are many fold, as life
itself. A prioritisation of human needs and a new value system has been recognised in
these areas. The right to sweet water, and the right to free air, are attributes of the
right to life, for these are the basic elements which sustain life itself." Attakoya
Thangal v. Union of India, 1990 A.I.R. 1 (K.L.T.) 580, 583 (Kerala H.C.) (India).
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was . . . a sacred duty of every one to protect them ... people
worshipped trees, rivers and sea which were treated as
belonging to all living creatures. The children were
educated ... about the necessity of keeping the environment
clean and protecting earth, rivers, sea, forests, trees, flora[,]
fona [sic] and every species of life. 106
The "time immemorial" natural law origin of the public trust doctrine
suggests that the doctrine is not subject to political reversal, and
Indian courts continue to reference its Roman roots.o 7 In fact, the
India Supreme Court has even located its foundation in the Chen
Dynasty. 08
b.

Scope

The scope of the Indian public trust doctrine is vast: it covers all
natural resources. In the foundational case of Kamal Nath, which first
recognized the doctrine, the Indian Supreme Court declared that the
state government is trustee of "all natural resources," and the public is
the beneficiary of the "sea-shore, running waters, airs [sic], forests,
and ecologically fragile lands."' 09 The court then applied the doctrine
to parklands in the M.I. Builders case,o and a state court recognized
the doctrine's application to groundwater."' Clearly, the Indian
doctrine is not cabined by the navigable waters limits recognized in
some American states." 2
Recent decisions confirm the extensive scope of the Indian public
trust. In 2009, in Fomento Resorts & Hotels v. Minguel Martins, the
106 Fomento Resorts & Hotels v. Minguel Martins, (2009) I.N.S.C. 100, para. 36
(India), available at http://www.indiankanoon.org/doc/1238478/.
107 M.1 Builders, 6 S.C.C. at 466; Reliance Natural Res., Ltd. v. Reliance Indus., Ltd.,
available at
97-98
(India),
IV,
paras.
374,
pt.
(2010)
I.N.S.C.
http://www.indiankanoon.org/doc/1070490 (quoting Professor Sax); Fomento Resorts,
I.N.S.C. 100 para. 35 (quoting Mono Lake); Perumatty Grama Panchayat v. State,
available at
(Kerala
H.C.),
742
(2003)
K.L.T.
731,
(2004)
1
http://www.indiankanoon.org/doc/1161084/; Th. MarjaSingh, 1999 A.I.R. U.K.) at 82.
108 Reliance NaturalRes., Ltd., (2010) I.N.S.C. 374 at pt. IV, para. 98.
109 M.C. Mehta, in UN COMPENDIUM, supra note 96, at 272.

110 M.I. Builders, 6 S.C.C. at 466.

"..Perumatty Grama Panchayat, 1 K.L.T. at para. 34. The court upheld a
municipality's right to not renew a water license to Coca-Cola because "underground
water belongs to the public," and "the State has got a duty to protect groundwater
against excessive exploitation and the inaction of the State in this regard will
tantamount to infringement of the right to life . . . guaranteed under Article 21 of the
Constitution of India." Id.
112 See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
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Indian Supreme Court ruled that the resort violated the public trust by
constructing recreational facilities on a traditional footpath and
obstructing public beach access."' As the facilities were located some
two hundred meters from high tide,"' the scope of the trust's
application to shorelands is considerable. One year later, in Reliance
Natural Resources Ltd. v. Reliance Industries Ltd., the same court struck
down an offshore natural gas contract between companies because the
gas in India's territorial waters was publicly owned and subject to
public trust balancing to ensure fairness to future generations. 115
c.

Purposes

The purposes of the Indian public trust doctrine are as
encompassing as its scope. The Kamal Nath decision expressly ruled
that the purposes were not limited to the traditional purposes of
navigation, commerce, and fishing, but also included ecological
purposes." 6 The court declared the public to be the beneficiary of
"ecologically sensitive lands.""' In Fomento Resorts, the Indian

113 Fomento Resorts & Hotels v. Minguel Martins, (2009) I.N.S.C. 100, paras. 4041 (India), available at http://www.indiankanoon.org/doc/1238478/.

"

Id. para. 10(xxv).

Reliance Natural Res., Ltd. v. Reliance Indus., Ltd., (2010) I.N.S.C. 374, pt. IV,
paras. 97-98 (India), available at http://www.indiankanoon.org/doc/1070490. The
Court interpreted article 297 of the Indian Constitution, which provides that all lands,
minerals, resources, and things of value under the ocean within territorial waters
"shall vest in the Union and be held for the purposes of the Union" to mean that the
"people as a nation" are the "true owners" of the natural gas. Id. paras. 87-88 (citing
INDIA CONST. art. 297). The Court also relied on article 39, which calls for an equitable
distribution of India's material resources to "best subserve the common good," and the
principle of equality in Article 14 of the Constitution to require balancing
intergenerational equity in future contract negotiations. See id. pt. IV, para. 84-100
(citing INDIA CONST. art. 39, 14). Finally, the court ordered a renegotiation of the
natural gas contract, with government participation, to conform to these provisions
and the public trust doctrine. Id. pt. IV, para. 163.
115

116

M.C. Mehta, in UN COMPENDIUM, supra note 96, at 272.

Id. ("It is no doubt correct that the public trust doctrine under the English
common law extended only to certain traditional uses such as navigation, commerce
and fishing. But the American Courts in recent cases have expanded the concept of the
public trust doctrine . . .. We see no reason why the public trust doctrine should not
be expanded to include all ecosystems operating in our natural resources.").
Ecological purposes are also evident in articles 48A ("The State shall endeavour [sic]
to protect and improve the environment and to safeguard the forests and wild life of
the country.") and 51A ("It shall be the duty of every citizen of India - (g) to protect
and improve the natural environment including forests, lakes, rivers and wild life, and
to have compassion for living creatures.") of the Indian Constitution. INDIA CONST.
arts. 48A, 51A.
117
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Supreme Court upheld the public's continued use of a footpath for
beach access against a resort development because it was a "time
immemorial" public use of "common properties," at least in part for
recreation.118
Public trust purposes also extend to ensuring a fair distribution of
the revenues produced from publicly owned resources, such as natural
gas leases." 9 This fair distribution includes concerns for
intergenerational equity. 20 According to a state court, the purposes
also include regulating resources according to the precautionary
principle.m
d.

Public Standing

Indian case law indicates widespread recognition of the right of
citizens to enforce the public trust doctrine, regardless of personal
injury, so long as the individual or group is not economically selfinterested. 22 Citizens may sue any level of government, as well as
private entities, since the Indian public trust doctrine appears to
burden private parties and the government.123 However, in 2002, the
Indian Supreme Court curtailed standing somewhat by requiring
citizens to seek out a non-profit or other organization as a proxy,
although they can still file a public trust doctrine suit if there is no
willing organization.12 1
e.

Remedies

Indian courts have awarded injunctive relief, ordered restitution and
money damages, and rescinded private contracts for violations of the
public trust doctrine."' These remedies may be enforced against both
government agencies and private parties. 2 6
Fomento Resorts, I.N.S.C. 100, para. 40.
Reliance Natural Res., Ltd., I.N.S.C. 374, pt. IV, para. 99.
120 Id. pt. IV, paras.
94, 99.
121 Th. Majra Singh v. Indian Oil Corp., 1999 A.I.R. 81 Q.K.) 82-83 (Jammu &
Kashmir H.C.) (India) (involving a liquefied natural gas plant, whose continued
operation was conditioned on regulation under the precautionary principle).
122 Interview with Professor Bhat, supra note 98.
123 Id.; see, e.g., Fomento Resorts, I.N.S.C. 100 (concerning a suit against a private
resort); M.C. Mehta, in UN COMPENDIUM, supra note 96 (involving a suit against the
Union of India's Minister of Environment and Forests, as well as the Himachal
Pradesh provincial Pollution Control Board and a privately owned motel).
"' Interview with Professor Bhat, supra note 98.
125 See, e.g., M.I. Builders Private Ltd. v. Radhey Shyam Sahu, (1999) 6 S.C.C. 470
(enjoining
available at http://www.indiankanoon.org/doc/1937304/
(India),
118
"o
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2.

Pakistan: Original Jurisdiction in the Supreme Court

a.

Origins and Basis

Pakistan's public trust doctrine seems embedded in article 9 of the
constitution, which declares that "[nlo person shall be deprived of life
or liberty save in accordance with law."' 2 7 Although neither the
constitution nor Pakistan statutes expressly mention the public trust,
the Supreme Court of Pakistan has concluded that the article 9
guarantee of life includes environmental health and has issued
protective orders to both private and government entities.
The first case to establish the public trust doctrine was the 1992
Supreme Court decision in In Re Human Rights Case (Environmental
Pollution in Balochistan).12 8 This case involved proposed industrial and
nuclear waste dumping on coastal land in the southern province of
Balochistan.129 Responding to a newspaper article alleging violations of
fundamental rights, the Supreme Court took original jurisdiction of
the case.130 The Court ruled that any such dumping would "create
environmental hazard and pollution" in violation of article 9,1" thus
assuming without explanation the constitutional right to life implicitly
included environmental health as well.
The court proceeded to request reports from the provincial head as
to whether the local development authority had granted any coastal
land for these purposes and, upon receiving assurances of no
dumping, ordered the provincial government and the development

construction of a shopping complex); Fomento Resorts, I.N.S.C. 100, 58 (India)
(upholding the enjoining of a resort's construction of recreational facilities);
Perumatty Grama Panchayat v. State, (2004) 1 K.L.T. 731, 742 (2003) (Kerala H.C.),
available at http://www.indiankanoon.org/doc/1161084/ (enjoining Coca-Cola from
groundwater pumping); M.C. Mehta, in UN COMPENDIUM, supra note 96, at 273-74
(requiring a resort to pay for the government cost of restoring a riverbed); Reliance
Natural Res., Ltd. I.N.S.C. 374 at 199-209 (rescinding a natural gas pricing agreement
and requiring the contracting parties to renegotiate the contract, with governmental
participation, to ensure equitable revenue sharing).
126 Interview with Professor Bhat, supra note 98. See description of cases and
defendants supra note 125.
127 PAKISTAN CONST. art. 9.
'1
(1994) 46 PLD (SC) 102 (1992) (Pak.), in UN COMPENDIUM, supra note 96, at
280-81.
19 Id. at 280.
"o Id. Under article 184(3) of the constitution, the supreme court has original
jurisdiction over fundamental rights, such as the right to life. See PAKISTAN CONST. art.
184(3).
" In re Human Rights, 46 PLD (SC) 102, in UN COMPENDIUM, supra note 96, at 280.
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authority to condition any grants of coastal land on no-dumping.'
The court also directed the authorities to stop any dumping or
discharging from vessels off the coast.'
Two years after the Environmental Pollution in Balochistan case, the
Supreme Court decided Zia v. WAPDA.1 4 In response to a letter
criticizing the Water and Power Development Authority by four
residents opposing a government proposal to install an electric grid in
a residential area, the Court again assumed original jurisdiction over
the case.1 5 Citing Indian cases that interpreted the right to life to
include environmental health, the Court observed that:
[Tihese judgments go a long way to show that in cases where
the life of citizens is degraded, the quality of life is adversely
affected and health hazards are created affecting a large
number of people, the Court in exercise of its [constitutional]
jurisdiction . . . may grant relief to the extent of stopping the
functions of factories which create pollution and
environmental degradation." 6
Embracing the precautionary principle, the Court directed the
government to conduct research on the potential harmful effects of
electromagnetic energy and required that any future siting of
electricity facilities be preceded by public notice and an opportunity
for public comment.137 The Zia decision made clear that the right to
life included the right to environmental health:
The word 'life' is very significant as it covers all facts of human
existence. The word 'life' has not been defined in the
Constitution but it does not mean nor can it be restricted only
to the vegetative or animal life or mere existence from
conception to death ... A wide meaning should be given to
enable a man not only to sustain life but to enjoy it . .. The

Constitution guarantees dignity of man and also right to 'life'
under Article 9 and if both are read together, questions will
arise whether a person can be said to have dignity of man if his
right to life is below bare necessity like without proper food,

132
133

Id. at 281.

Id.

13 Shehla Zia v. WAPDA, (1994) 46 PLD (SC) 693 (Pak.), in UN COMPENDIUM,
supra note 96, at 323.
135 See id. (abstract).
136 Id. at 334.
137 Id.
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clothing, shelter, education, health care, clean atmosphere and
unpolluted environment. . ."'
A third Pakistani case, General Secretary, West Pakistan Salt Miners
Labor Union v. The Director, Industries and Mineral Development was
another original jurisdiction case brought under article 9 by residents
of Khewra township in the province of Jhelum, who sought
cancellation of mining leases in a water catchment area reserved for
domestic and municipal purposes.13 ' The granting of the mining leases
coincided with a reduction in the local water supply of six- to eight-

fold. 14 0
Quoting extensively from the Zia decision's discussion of article 9's
right to life, the Pakistan Supreme Court issued several orders to
protect Khewra township's water supply. First, the court directed the
Punjab Coal Company to move the mouth of its mine away from the
township's water catchment area. Second, the court ordered the
Pakistan Mineral Development Corporation to install an additional
pipeline and to construct a containment well, the cost of which would
be paid by the mining companies. Third, the court required the
establishment of a government commission to investigate the mining
operations and determine whether the mining should proceed.14 '
Finally, the Court ordered the government to refrain from granting or
renewing any mining license within the township's water catchment
basin, requiring renewal of any other mining leases only with the
permission of the court.14 2 Because of the these affirmative obligations
imposed on the government to protect public resources at the request
of public petitioners, the Salt Miners decision was categorized as a
public trust doctrine case by both the United Nations Environment
Programme and the High Court of Kenya."
b.

Scope

Since the government of Pakistan has affirmative obligations to
protect the constitutionally entrenched right to life, and because the
Id. at 333-34.
Gen. Sec'y W. Pak. Salt Miners Union v. Dir. of Indus. & Mineral Dev. (Salt
Miners) (1994) SCMR (SC) 2061 (1993) (Pak.), in UN COMPENDIUM, supra note 96, at
282-84. The Court cited its authority under article 184(3) for its jurisdiction. Id. at 284.
140 Id. at 283-84.
141 Id. at 288.
142 Id.
143 See UN COMPENDIUM, supra note 96, at iv (classifying Salt Miners case as a
public trust doctrine case).
138

'
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right to life includes environmental health, the public trust doctrine
appears to protect against actions that threaten a "clean atmosphere
and unpolluted environment."" But because the case law is sparse
and the Pakistan Supreme Court has discussed the government's
duties only in the context of the constitutional right to life, it is hard
to see any limits on the scope of the Pakistan public trust doctrine.
Apparently the government has a trust duty to prevent harm to all
natural resources where the public interest is involved.
c.

Purposes

The case law has made clear that the public trust doctrine protects
water resources, especially drinking water, from pollution.'4 5 But, the
doctrine seems co-extensive with any environmental resources
protected by the constitutional right to life. 146
d.

Public Standing

The public has standing to sue in the Pakistani Supreme Court to
prevent harm to the environment, which arises from an implicit
fundamental right under article 184(3) of the constitution. The article
declares that "the Supreme Court shall, if it considers that a question
of public importance with reference to the enforcement of any
Fundamental Rights [like article 9's right to life]" have the power to
issue orders to protect those rights. 4 7 The court has interpreted its
article 184(3) jurisdiction broadly, stating that no individual injury is
a necessary trigger: "It is well settled that in human rights cases/public
interest litigation . . . the procedural trappings and restrictions of

being an aggrieved person and other similar technical objections
cannot bar the jurisdiction of the Court."' Thus, no standing barriers
fetter the public's right to enforce the Pakistan public trust doctrine.
e.

Remedies

Injunctive relief is available in cases involving fundamental rights.
Discussing its original jurisdiction over fundamental rights cases, the
Pakistan Supreme Court noted its power to "grant relief to the extent
See Zia, 46 PLD (SC) 693, in UN COMPENDIUM, supra note 96, at 333-34.
"' See, e.g., Salt Miners, SCMR (SC) 2061, in UN COMPENDIUM, supra note 96, at
286 (describing right of every person to have unpolluted water).
16 PAKISTAN CONST. art. 9.
144

14

Id. art. 184(3).

148

Salt Miners, SCMR (SC) 2061, in UN COMPENDIUM, supra note 96, at 287.
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of stopping the functioning of factories which create pollution and
environmental degradation."149 The court also granted affirmative
injunctive relief in several cases,150 although it has yet to award money
damages. Article 199 of the constitution, which authorizes courts
hearing public interest cases to make orders "as may be appropriate
for the enforcement of any of the Fundamental Rights .

.

[,]"

suggests that courts have broad discretion as to remedies.
3.

Philippines: Cleaning Up Manila Bay

a. Origins and Basis
The earliest manifestation of the Filipino public trust doctrine was
in the Water Code of 1976, which declared that all waters belong to
the State.' The code also recognized a public easement on the banks
of rivers and streams, as well as the shores of seas and lakes, for
"recreation, navigation, floatage, fishing, and salvage."'15 A year later,
the 1977 Environmental Policy echoed the language of the U.S.
National Environmental Policy Act in declaring that the nation would
"recognize, discharge and fulfill the responsibilities of each generation
as trustee and guardian of the environment for succeeding
generations." 54

"' Zia, 46 PLD (SC) 693, in UN COMPENDIUM, supra note 96, at 334.
150 See supra notes 132-33, 136-37, 141-42 and accompanying text.
151 PAKISTAN CONST. art. 199(1)(c).
152 The Water Code of the Philippines, A Decree Instituting a Water Code, Thereby
Revising and Consolidating Laws Governing the Ownership, Appropriation,
Utilization, Exploitation, Development, Conservation and Protection of Water
Resources, Pres. Dec. No. 1067 art. 3 (Dec. 31, 1976) (Phil.), available at
[hereinafter
http://www.lawphil.net/statutes/presdecs/pdl976/pd_1067_1976.html
Water Code of the Philippines]. The code defines waters broadly to include surface
water, groundwater, atmospheric water, and sea water. Id. art. 4.
153 Id. art. 51.
154 Philippine Environmental Policy, Pres. Dec. No. 1151, § 2 (June 6, 1977) (Phil.);
see also id. § 1 (U.S. NEPA-like language: "It is hereby declared a continuing policy of
the State (a) to create, develop, maintain and improve conditions under which man and
nature can thrive in productive and enjoyable harmony with each other, (b) to fulfill the
social, economic and other requirements of present and future generations of Filipinos,
and (c) to insure the attainments of an environmental quality that is conducive to a life
of dignity and well-being"); cf. 42 U.S.C. § 4331 (NEPA's language). The Filipino policy
also emphasizes that each citizen owed a duty to future generations to protect the
environment, and that each was entitled to a healthful environment. Philippine
Environmental Policy, § 3. An ensuing Environmental Code which, like the
Environmental Policy and the Water Code, was issued by Presidential decree - the
equivalent of statutes in those pre-constitutional days declared that natural resource
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The Filipino Constitution of 1987 then entrenched the right to a
healthy environment recognized in the 1977 Environmental Policy,
announcing that "[t]he State shall protect and advance the right of the
people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm
and harmony of nature."155 The Filipino Supreme Court would later
interpret this language to codify public trust principles. 156
In 1993, the Supreme Court decided Oposa v. Factoran, a case in
which schoolchildren filed a class action challenging timber license
agreements issued by the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources.157 The license authorized harvesting virtually all of the
trees in the country."5 After a lower court dismissed the case, the
Supreme Court reversed, ruling that: (1) the children were sufficiently
numerous to constitute a class; (2) they had standing under the
constitution to raise future generations' concern for a healthy
environment and intergenerational equity; (3) the issues the case
raised were not unreviewable political questions; and (4) the licenses
policy would "obtain optimum benefits" and preserve natural resources for future
generations. Philippine Environmental Code, Pres. Doc. No. 1152, § 25 (June 6, 1977)
(Phil.), available at http://lawphil.net/statutes/presdecs/pdl977pd_1152_1977.html. See
generally THELAwPHILPROJECT, http://www/lawphil.net (last visited Sept. 27, 2011)
(providing equivalent of statutes in pre-constitutional days).
1" CONST. (1987), art. 11, sec. 16, (Phil.), available at http:/Aawphil.net/constil
consl987.html. Two 1987 executive orders implemented the Constitution's right to a
healthy environment, the first of which called for "equitable sharing" of the benefits of
natural resource management among present and future generations of Filipinos
under a policies of sustained and use equitable access to natural resources, thereby
reorganizing the Department of Environment and Natural Resources. Department of
Environmental and Natural Resources; Renaming It As the Department of
Environmental and Natural Resources and for Other Purposes, Exec. Ord. No. 192, H§
3, 4 (June 10, 1987) (Phil.), available at http://www.lawphil.net/executive/execord/
eo1987/eo_192_1987.html (providing perambulatory language only). The second
1987 executive order substantially restated the first order's policies in an
administrative code, directing the department to manage the development and
conservation of the Filipino "forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore
areas and other natural resources," maintaining "a sound ecological balance" and
making such resources "equitably accessible" to present and future generations,
including accounting for the "social and environmental cost implications" of
development and conservation of natural resources. Instituting the "Administrative
Code of 1987," Exec. Ord. No. 292, § 1 (1987) (Phil.), available at
http:/www.lawphil.net/executivelexecord/eol987/eo_292-1987.html.
156 See infra notes 161-62, 169 and accompanying text.
157

Oposa v. Factoran, G.R. No. 101083, 224 S.C.R.A. 792, 797-98 (Aug. 9, 1993)

(Phil.), in UN COMPENDIUM, supra note 96, at 25.
11 The Secretary granted licenses to harvest some 3.89 million hectares of forest.
At the time, there were approximately 850,000 hectares of virgin old-growth forest
and 3.0 million hectares of secondary-growth forests on the Phillipine archipelago. Id.
at 26.
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were not constitutionally protected contracts under the Filipino
Constitution."' Without reaching the merits of the children's
claims,160 the court used sweeping language to interpret the right to
healthy environment, suggesting it was more basic than other rights
because "it concerns nothing less than self-preservation and selfperpetuation," which "need not even be written in the Constitution for
they are assumed to exist from the inception of humankind." 61 This
declaration of the natural law foundations of the environmental right
imposed "a solemn obligation" to preserve a healthy ecology and
protect public health not only for the present, but also for future
generations; otherwise, they would "stand to inherit nothing but the
parched earth incapable of sustaining life."1 62
Despite the Court's ringing endorsement of the public trust doctrine
in Oposa, the case turned out to have remarkably little effect on timber
harvesting in the Philippines. The Court did not cancel the timber
licenses or enjoin the issuance of new licenses as the children
requested; instead, it ruled only that lower court improperly dismissed
the case for failing to state a cause of action.16 1 Since the children
failed to pursue the case, no timber license was ever cancelled, and
commercial logging continued largely unabated.164
Fifteen years after Oposa, the Philippines Supreme Court revisited
the right to a healthy environment and clarified that the government
had a trust obligation. In MetropolitanManila Development Authority v.
Concerned Residents of Manila Bay, fourteen residents alleged in a class
action suit that ten government agencies failed to prevent pollution of
Manila Bay, violating numerous statutory duties as well as the public
trust doctrine. 16 5 A lower court issued a comprehensive injunction,
159 Id. at 28 (class size); id. at 28-29 (standing); id. at 31-32 (political question); id.
at 32-33 (non-contract). On the political question issue, the court ruled that the
Filipino Constitution bolstered the judiciary's authority to review abuses of discretion
in any branch of government. Id. at 31.
160 See infra note 163 and accompanying text.
161 Oposa, 224 S.C.R.A. 792, in UN COMPENDIUM, supra note 96, at 29.
162 Id.
163 See Dante B. Gatmaylan, The Illusion of Intergenerational Equity: Oposa v.
Factoran as a Pyrrhic Victory, 15 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 457, 467 (2003).
See id. at 467-68 (noting that at the end of 2001, there were still a total of 1.34
'
million hectares of forestland under license; the only reductions apparently occurring
due to failure of timber companies to comply with government regulations).
165 Metro. Manila Dev. Auth. v. Concerned Residents of Manila Bay (Metro Manila),
G.R. No. 171947-48, 574 S.C.R.A. 661 (S.C., Dec. 18, 2008) (Phil.) available at
see
http://sc.judiciary.gov.phljurisprudence/2008/december2008/171947-48.htm;
Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr., Manila Bay: A Daunting Challenge in Environmental
Rehabilitation and Protection, 11 OR. REV. INT'L L. 441, 442 (2009) (describing the
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and the Supreme Court affirmed.' 6 The injunction required various
government agencies to fulfill their trust duty through a variety of
actions, from constructing sewage treatment facilities, to restocking
Manila Bay with indigenous fish, to "inculcatling in the minds and
hearts of the people" the importance of the environment through
education.'6 7 The court concluded that the pollution of the bay was so
severe that it required the trial court's continuing jurisdiction to
monitor cleanup efforts.168
At the end of its Manila Bay opinion, the Filipino Supreme Court
made clear that that the basis of its decision was the public trust
doctrine, and that its origins lay in natural law:
So it was in Oposa v. Factora,the Court stated that the right to
a balanced and healthful ecology need not even be written in
the Constitution for it is assumed, like other civil and political
rights guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, to exist from the
inception of mankind and it is an issue of transcendental
importance with intergenerational implications. Even
assuming the absence of a categorical legal provision
specifically prodding petitioners to clean up the bay, they and
the men and women representing them cannot escape their
obligation to future generations of Filipinos to keep the waters
of the Manila Bay clean and clear as humanly as possible.
Anything less would be a betrayal of the trust reposed in
them. 1'9
pollution as coming from "uncaring factory and other business owners operating
without waste management facilities; around 70,000 families of illegal settlers along
six major rivers and numerous waterways which empty into the bay; unabated and
unlawful dumping of waste from Metro Manila residents, as the metro area does not
have a sanitary landfill; the unauthorized dumping of wastes from ships; and the
abject indifference of people and government institutions that could have otherwise
turned things around"). The journal article's author is an Associate justice of the
Supreme Court of the Phillipines. Id.
16 Metro Manila, 574 S.C.R.A. The trial court of Imus, Cavite's injunction called for
the government to draw up a cleanup plan, including a timetable and a budget. The
court of appeals affirmed. See Rita Linda V. Jimeno, Who Will Clean Up Manila Bay?,
MANILA STANDARD TODAY, (Aug. 18, 2008), http://www.manilastandardtoday.con
2008/aug/18/ritaLindajimeno.htm.
67 Metro Manila, 574 S.C.R.A. The details of the injunction are set forth in Velasco,
supra note 165, at 446-48 n.19.
1s
Metro Manila, 574 S.C.R.A. (requiring quarterly progress reports); see Juan
Arturo Iluminado C. de Castro, Clean Up Manila Bay: Mandamus as a Tool for
Environmental Protection, 37 ECOLOGY L.Q. 797, 801 (2010) (describing the
"continuing mandamus" invoked by the court as "unheard of in the country before").
' Metro Manila, 574 S.C.R.A.
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Thus, although the primary basis of the Filipino public trust doctrine
jurisprudence lies in the constitutional right balanced and healthful
ecology, the Court has ruled that the constitutional right merely
reflects the public trust doctrine. The doctrine in turn is part of
natural law rights to self-preservation and self-perpetuation that have
existed from time immemorial.
b.

Scope

The scope of the Filipino public trust doctrine is expansive,
encompassing terrestrial, aquatic, and marine resources, and providing
public access for recreational and ecological purposes, as well as
traditional public trust purposes. For example, the 1976 Water Code
recognized a public easement on the banks of rivers and streams, and
the shores of the seas and lakes, "throughout their entire length" of
varying scope depending on the location."o The Water Code also
declared public ownership of all waters,' 7 ' indicating that the trust
may apply to water rights administration.
In Oposa, the Supreme Court applied the trust to forests and opined
that it burdens all natural resources, including minerals, lands, waters,
fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas, and other natural resources in
addition to forests.17 2 This comprehensive scope is obviously not tied
to traditional notions of navigability that continue to limit the public
trust doctrine in some American states. 73
c.

Purposes

The purposes of the Filipino public trust doctrine are as extensive as
its scope. They encompass recreational and ecological purposes, as
well as traditional purposes of navigation and fishing. For example,
the Water Code's upland easement is ancillary to "recreation,
navigation, floatage, fishing, and salvage" purposes."7 The code also
contemplates the preservation of swamps and marshes for waterfowl
and wildlife.' The court in Metro Manila recognized that "[tihe
1o See Water Code of the Philippines, supra note 152, art. 51. The scope of this
upland easement varies from three meters in urban areas to twenty meters in
agricultural areas to 40 meters in forest areas, although no one may stay longer than
necessary for recreation, navigation, floatage, fishing, or salvage purposes, nor build
any structures. Id.
17

Id. art. 3(a).

1
173

Oposa, 224 S.C.R.A. 792, in UN COMPENDIUM, supra note 96, at 28-29.
See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
Water Code of the Philippines, supra note 152, art. 51.
Id. art. 74.

174
175
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importance of Manila Bay as a sea resource, playground, and as a
historical landmark cannot be overemphasized."" 6 Furthermore, the
Oposa court advocated for not only considering ecological integrity
when interpreting the constitutional right to a balanced and healthy
ecology, but also considering intergenerational equity as well:
Nature means the created world in its entirety. Such rhythm
and harmony indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious
and
management,
renewal
disposition,
utilization,
conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, waters,
fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural resources
to the end that their exploitation, development and utilization
be equitably accessible to the present as well as future
generations. 117
Thus, the purposes of the public trust doctrine in the Philippines
extend not only to the management and conservation of natural
resources, but also to their equitable distribution among generations.
d.

Public Standing

The public has standing to enforce the Philippines public trust
doctrine. In Oposa, the Supreme Court recognized the right of a class
of school children to file suit to protect the country's virgin
rainforests. The Court characterized the issue as one "of common and
general interest . . . to all citizens of the Philippines." 7" The Court also
upheld the right of the children to sue based on intergenerational
equity:
We find no difficulty in ruling that they can, for themselves,
for others of their generation and for succeeding generations,
file a class suit. Their personality to suit in behalf of the
succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of
intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a
balanced and healthful ecology is concerned .

...

Needless to

say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to
preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a
balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the
minors' assertion of their rights to a sound environment
constitutes, as the same time, the performance of their

176

'
11

Metro Manila, 574 S.C.R.A.
Oposa, in UN COMPENDIUM, supra note 96, at 28-29.
Id. at 796, 802.
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obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the
generations to come." 9
The Metro Manila court assumed without discussion the standing of
the Concerned Residents of Manila Bay, an organization of fourteen
residents.'8"
e.

Remedies

Equitable relief, including continuing judicial oversight, is available
to enforce the Filipino public trust doctrine. In Metro Manila, the
Filipino Supreme Court directed the lower court to maintain
continuing judicial oversight over the cleanup of Manila Bay.' 8 ' The
court approved far-reaching injunctive relief requiring both affirmative
duties and imposing negative restrictions on governmental agencies.182
An Associate Justice of the Filipino Supreme Court has suggested
continuing mandamus in the context of Manila Bay "might as well be
viewed as a perpetual mandamus."8 8 To oversee the implementation
of the injunction, the court created an advisory committee chaired by
a justice of the court and three experts. 8 1
'
Id. at 802-03. The Oposa court reversed the lower court's dismissal based on
political question grounds, ruling that "the political question doctrine is no longer the
insurmountable obstacle to the exercise of judicial power or the impenetrable shield
that protects executive and legislative actions from judicial inquiry or review" because
the 1987 Constitution expanded the judicial power. Id. at 810.
"0 See Velasco, supra note 165, at 444-45 (noting that had the court considered the
standing issue it would have allowed the suit to proceed on the ground that the issues
were of "paramount interest to the public" or were "of transcendental significance to
the people," even though Filipino jurisprudence is patterned after the American
standing rule of requiring a "personal and sufficient stake in the outcome of the
controversy" and direct individual harm that is "greater than an inconvenience
suffered by the general public").
181 Metro Manila, 574 S.C.R.A.
182 Id.; see de Castro, supra note 168, at 802-04 (comparing mandamus in the
Philippines with that in the U.S.); Velasco, supra note 165, at 446-48 n.19 (clarifying
scope of the injunction), 453 (observing that although continuing mandamus was not
expressly authorized by the Supreme Court's procedural rules, it was not prohibited
either, and citing precedent from Indian courts).
183 Velasco, supranote 165, at 454.
11 See id. at 455. To "enhance environmental justice," on January 28, 2008, the
Court issued an administrative order designating 117 environmental courts, the
judges of which would be trained in environmental law at the Philippine Judicial
Academy. The Court also promised to approve special rules of procedure in
environmental cases, which would, among other measures, allow citizen suits, call for
forfeiture of objects seized in breach of environmental laws, dismiss strategic lawsuits
against public participation, exempt bonding requirements, call for the Philippines
Legal Aid program to provide pro bono representation in environmental cases, and
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The Public Trust Doctrine in Africa

1. Uganda: Preventing Deforestation Through Local Consent
a.

Origins and Basics

The Ugandan public trust doctrine first appeared in a 2004 decision
of a trial court -

the High Court of Uganda at Kampala -

in

Advocates Coalition for Development and Environment (ACODE) v.
Attorney General.' In this case, Kakira Sugar Works had a
longstanding lease to take firewood from the Butamira Forest Reserve
for its sugar refinery. Kakira applied for a fifty year permit from the
National Environmental Management Authority to transform the
forest reserve into plantation lands.186 The government granted the
permit, and ACODE challenged the permit on public trust and
statutory grounds."' The High Court concluded that management
authority breached its public trust duty under both the Ugandan
Constitution and statutes by not obtaining the consent of the local
community and not performing an environmental impact
assessment.188 The court observed that although the government had
no authority to alienate the jus publicum in trust lands, it could issue
permits or licenses only with local consent, which was not evident in
the case of the Kakira permit."'
The High Court located the public trust doctrine in the 1995
Constitution's objectives and principles of state policy, which
require the bar to appoint special counsels in environmental cases. See id. at 457-58.
18' Advocates Coal. for Dev. & Env't v. Att'y Gen. (ACODE), Misc. Cause No. 0100
of 2004 (July 11, 2005) (Uganda), available at http://www.greenwatch.or.ug/
pdfljudgements/ACODEvsAttorneyGeneral.pdf.
"' Id. at 2. The Busoga Kingdom Government issued the original firewood lease in
1939 for a period of 32 years. Id. at 3. The Forestry Department granted the permit at
issue in 1997 for "general purposes," after which time Kakira Sugar Works began
clearing forested land. Id. at 4.
18

Id. at 1-2.

Id. at 11. The National Environment Act of 1995 requires "prior environmental
assessments of proposed projects which may significantly affect the environment or
use of natural resources." National Environment Act (Ch. 153(2)(i)/1995) (Uganda),
available at http://www.ulii.org/ug/legis/consol_act/neal995237/. The plaintiffs also
alleged that the public trust doctrine was "enshrined under the National objectives
and directive principles of intergenerational equity as enshrined in the convention on
Biological Diversity, 1992 and the Rio Declaration, 1992 which Uganda has either
ratified and signed or subscribed to," implicating international treaties. ACODE, Misc.
Cause No. 0100 of 2004, at 2.
1'8 ACODE, Misc. Cause No. 0100 of 2004, at 8. The court noted that 1,500 local
residents protested the license. Id.
188
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announce that "[tihe shall protect important natural resources,
including land, water, wetlands, minerals, oil, fauna and flora on
behalf of the people of Uganda."l9 0 This constitutional public trust
doctrine is restated in article 237 of the constitution, clarifying that
both federal and local governments "shall hold in trust for the people
and protect natural lakes, rivers, wetlands, forest reserves, game
reserves, national parks and any land to be reserved for ecological and
touristic purposes for the common good of all citizens .

..

."1 In

addition, the constitution proclaims that "[elvery Uganda has a right
to a clean and healthy environment."1 9 2
These constitutional provisions have been substantially restated in
statutes, such as in the Land Act, which expands upon the
constitutional list of trust resources to include "ground water, natural
ponds, natural streams."' The statute also authorizes the government
"from time to time [tol review any land held in trust by the
Government or any local government whenever the community in the
area or district where the reserved land is situated so demands."1 4 The
Land Act's requirement of local consent for the alienation of trust
resources, which the court attributed to the public trust doctrine,
appeared to be a decisive factor in the ACODE decision. 195
The National Environment Act also incorporates the constitutional
notions of public health and the public trust doctrine.1'9 The statute
promises "all people living in the country the fundamental right to an
190 CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA [CRU] art. 13, available at
http://www.ugandaemb.org/Constitution-oLUganda.pdf; see also id. art. 27 (directing
the state to "promote sustainable development and public awareness of the need to
manage land, air, and water resources in a balanced and sustainable manner of the
present and future generations," and that the natural resources of Uganda "shall be
managed in such a way as to meet the development and environmental needs of
present and future generations and . . . to take all possible measures to prevent or
minimize damage or and destruction to land, air and water resources resulting from
pollution or other causes.").
19 Id. art. 237(2)(b).
192 Id. art. 39.
193 The
Land Act (Act. No. 16, § 45 1988) (Uganda), available at
http://faolex.fao.org/docs/pdf/ugal9682.pdf.
194 Id. §45(6).
19
ACODE, Misc. Cause No. 0100 of 2004, 10 (July 11, 2005) (Uganda), available
at http://www.greenwatch.or.ug/pdf/judgements/ACODEvsAttomeyGeneral.pdf ("If it
is true that land in Uganda belongs to the people as provided in the laws, it should be
equally true that the local community in Butamira should have been consulted as a
matter of transparency, accountability, and good governance as demanded by the
public trust doctrine.").
16 See id. at 8 (discussing the National Environment Act, which was unavailable
from WorldLii and other databases).
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environment adequate for their health and well being ... use and
conser[vation of] the environment and natural resources of Uganda
equitably and for the benefit and both present and future
generations ..

"

The language calling for conservation for future

generations implicitly invokes public trust principles. For example,
the ACODE court ruled that the government violated the National
Environment Act by failing to perform an environmental impact
assessment on the effect of Kakira's planned transformation of the
Butamira Forest into a sugar cane plantation.' 9
b.

Scope

The scope of the Ugandan public trust doctrine parallels that of
India's and the Philippines's in its comprehensiveness, 9 9 extending far
upland from navigable waters. The doctrine includes all surface water,
including wetlands; groundwater; and substantially all public lands,
including forest and game reserves, national parks, and "other land
reserved for ecological and touristic purposes for the common
good."2 00 Wildlife, plant life, and mineral resources are also
constitutionally protected trust resources.20 1
c.

Purposes

Uganda's public trust doctrine reaches considerably beyond
traditional purposes of navigation, fishing, and commerce. Both the
Constitution and the Land Act call for ecological and recreational
protection.202 The ACODE decision recognized far-reaching public
trust purposes, stating that "Itihe right to health does not ... stop at
physical health. It covers intellectual, moral cultural, spiritual,
political, and social wellbeing."2 03 Thus, the Ugandan doctrine
encompasses religious and medicinal purposes, in addition to
ecological, recreational, and traditional purposes.

19' See id. Compare this statutory language with the Philippines' right to a
"balanced and healthful ecology." See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
1I
ACODE, Misc. Cause No. 0100 of 2004, at 8.
199 See M.C. Mehta, in UN COMPENDIUM, supra note 96, at 272 (India); Oposa, 224
S.C.R.A. 792, in UN COMPENDIUM, supra note 96, at 29 (Philippines).
200 CoNsTrIrUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA [CRUI art. 237(2)(b); The Land Act,
Act (No. 16, § 45(1) 1988) (Uganda), available at http://faolex.fao.org/docs/pdf/
ugal9682.pdf.

201

CRU art. XIII.

202

Id.; The Land Act § 45(1).
ACODE, Misc. Cause No. 0100 of 2004, at 11.

203
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Public Standing

Any member of the public may sue to enforce the Ugandan public
trust doctrine. Article 50 of the Ugandan Constitution stipulates that
"any person who claims that a fundamental or other right or freedom
guaranteed under this constitution has been infringed or threatened, is
entitled to apply to a competent court for redress which may include
compensation."" The same provision also authorizes "any person or
organization" to file suit to vindicate "another person's or group's
rights."20 ' The constitution also makes clear that "[flundamental rights
and freedoms of the individual are inherent and not granted by the
State."206
Since the public trust doctrine is clearly entrenched in article 237 of
the doctrine is "a right or freedom" which the
the constitution,
public may enforce in court. Moreover, a plaintiff need not be injured
to have a case heard, a fact which the ACODE court emphasized: "The
importance of [article 50] is that it allows any individual or
organization to protect the rights of another even though that
individual is not suffering the injury complained of or does not know
that he is suffering from the alleged injury." 208 The court elaborated:
To put it in the biblical sense the Article makes all of us our
brother['s] keeper." In that sense it gives all the power to
speak for those who cannot speak for their rights due to
ignorance, poverty or apathy. In that regard I cannot hide any
pride to say that our constitution is among the best the
[world] over because it emphasizes the point that violation of
any human right or fundamental right of one person is a
violation of the right of all.209
e.

Remedies

Violations of the public trust doctrine are subject to injunctive
relief, revocation of the jus privatum granted in trust resources, and
possibly damages and restitution. The ACODE court granted the
plaintiffs injunctive relief by voiding the permit issued to Kakira Sugar

CRU art. 50.
Id.
206 Id. art. 20(1).
2 See supra note 191 and accompanying text.
20 ACODE, Misc. Cause No. 0100 of 2004, at 6.
209 Id.
204
205
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Works.no But, the court rejected ACODE's claim for "restoration
orders" - essentially a request that the government restore the forest
to its pre-permit condition - because the court concluded that
"[siuch orders are only relevant to the party who is guilty of the
environmental damage."2 ' Thus, ACODE apparently should have
asked for restoration by Kakira, not the government.
Although the Ugandan Constitution expressly provides for
compensation for violations of constitutional rights, ACODE did not
seek money damages in the Butamira Forest case. Moreover, although
the plaintiffs did not seek to recover litigation costs, the court
addressed the issue on its own motion although it stated that since the
case involved public interest litigation, it would not award costs to the
plaintiffs because "[plublic interest litigation usually involves the
interest of the poor, ignorant, deprived, ill-informed, desperate and
marginalized society where justice is always high horse. The courts of
law should always be slow at awarding costs in such matters in order
to enhance access to justice. "212 Perhaps the court meant to suggest
that litigation costs would not be awarded to defendants in
unsuccessful public interest cases, since such awards would certainly
discourage plaintiffs from bringing such cases.
2.

Kenya: Remedying Water Pollution Through the Public Trust
Doctrine

a.

Origins and Basics

The earliest recognition of the public trust doctrine in Kenya
occurred in the High Court at Nairobi's 2006 decision in Waweru v.
Republic. This case involved an appeal of the imposition of criminal
sanctions on residents of Kiserian Township for discharging raw
sewage into the Kiserian River.21 ' Because the government sought
sanctions against only twenty-three of approximately 100 dischargers,
the court decided that the proceedings violated due process, but it

210
211
212

Id. at 11.
Id.
Id.

21 Waweru v. Republic, (2006) 1 K.L.R. 677, 677 (H.C.K.) (Kenya), available at
http://www.kenyalaw.org/environment/content/search-cases index.php?SearchTerm2
=Water. The government's Public Health Officer charged the residents with both the
discharges and for failing to comply with notice to abate the discharges for being
inconsistent with the Public Health Act, (2011) Cap. 242 §§ 118-20 (Kenya). Waweru,
1 K.L.R. 677 at 679.
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made clear that this result did not relieve the residents of their
obligations. 1
The High Court discussed the continuing environmental obligations
of both the residents and the government and took up the issue of the
public trust doctrine on its own motion. 215 The court noted that
section 3 of the Environmental Management and Coordination Act
("EMCA") gives the people the right to a clean and healthy
environment, and that section 71 of the Kenyan Constitution entitles
every person to the right to life. 216 The court elaborated:
In our view the right to life is not just a matter of keeping
body and soul together because in this modern age that right
could be threatened by many things including the
environment. The right to a clean environment is primary to
all creatures, including man. It is inherent from the act of
creation, the recent restatement in the Statutes and
Constitutions of the world notwithstanding."
Thus, although the High Court read the statutory right to a clean and
healthy environment into the constitutional right to life, it implied
that both are derived from natural law. The court proceeded to discuss
principles of sustainable development: the polluter pays principle, and
the precautionary principle, referencing international customary
law.218
The High Court stated that the "essence of public trust [doctrine] is
that the [SItate, as trustee, is under a fiduciary duty to deal with trust
property, being the common natural resources, in a manner that is in
the interests of the general public."2 1 ' Relying on two Pakistani cases
concerning that country's right to life provision,22 the court declared
that implicit in the Kenyan constitutional right to life was the public
trust doctrine."' The court also discussed the right to life in the
Waweru, 1 K.L.R. 677 at 684-86.
Id. at 688 (observing that the public trust doctrine was not expressly mentioned
in relevant environmental laws).
216 Id. at 687 (citing CONSTITUT1ON, art. 26 (2010) (Kenya) and Environmental
Management and Coordination Act, (1999) Cap. 8 § 3, 108).
217 Id. at 687.
218 Id. (referring
to the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment, the 1987
Development, and the United States World Commission on Environment and
Development).
219 Id. at 689.
220 See supra notes 134, 139 (discussing the Pakistani cases).
221 Waweru, 1 K.L.R. at 689-92 (citing Salt Miners, S.C.M.R. (SC) 2061 & Zia, 46
PLD (SC) 693).
214

215
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context of international treaties and intergenerational equity,
declaring, "the water table and the river courses affected are held in
trust by the present generation for the future generations." 222
Although the Waweru opinion seemed to commingle the public
trust doctrine with several environmental principles, the court
distinguished the trust doctrine in its discussion of remedies. Noting
that both the national government and the local county council had
statutory duties under the Water Act, the Local Government Act, and
the EMCA,22 the High Court ruled that they were "also under a public
trust to provide adequate land for the establishment of [water]
treatment works."224 Consequently, the court issued a mandamus
requiring the construction of such a facility because the Kiserian
residential development posed a "threat to life." Thus, the court
appeared to reaffirm that the public trust doctrine was embedded in
the constitutional right to life.22 5 In its clearest annunciation of the
public trust doctrine, the court declared: "In the case of land
resources, forests, wetlands and waterways[,] to give some examples[,]
the Government and its agencies are under a public trust to manage
them in a way that maintains a proper balance between the economic
benefits of development with the needs of a clean environment. "226
Since the Waweru decision, Kenya adopted a new constitution in
2010, which expressly incorporated the public trust doctrine that the
High Court found implicit in the constitutional right to life and the
statutory right to a clean and healthy environment. Retaining the right
to life in article 26, the new constitution added the right to a clean and
healthy environment in article 42, including the right "to have the
environment protected for the benefit of present and future
generations through legislative and other measures ..
22 Moreover,
article 69 requires the government to "ensure sustainable exploitation,
utilisation, management and conservation of the environment and
natural resources, and ensure the equitable sharing of the accruing
benefits" for the benefit of the people of Kenya.228
Id. at 691, 694.
Id. at 692 (discussing Local Government Act, (2010) Cap. 265 § 178-80; Water
Act, (2002) Cap. 372 § 8 (2002); Environmental Management and Coordination Act,
(1999) Cap. 8 § 3, 108).
224 Id.
225 Id. The right to life, located in article 71 of the Kenyan Constitution
at the time
of Waweru, is now in article 26. See CONSTITUTION, arts. 26, 46 (2010) (Kenya).
226 Waweru, 1 K.L.R. at
692.
227 CONSTITUTION, arts. 26, 42.
228 Id. art. 69. The same article also imposes duties on every person
"to cooperate
with State organs and other persons to protect and conserve the environment and
222
223
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The most explicit public trust language is in the 2010 constitution's
public land provisions. Article 61 declares that "[aill land in Kenya
belongs to the people of Kenya collectively as a nation, as
communities and as individuals." 229 Article 69 also requires the state
to eliminate activities that are likely to endanger the environment,
protect genetic resources and biological diversity, and work to
maintain tree cover on at least ten percent of the land. 23 0 Article 62
declares that the national government owns public lands "in trust for
the people of Kenya and shall be administered on their behalf by the
National Land Commission.2 3 ' Thus, the 2010 Constitution clearly
enshrines the public trust doctrine that the High Court first
recognized in Waweru just four years before.
b. Scope
The geographic scope of the Kenyan public trust doctrine is quite
broad. The Waweru court described "land resources, forests, wetlands
and waterways, to give some examples" as trust resources for which
the government owes fiduciary duties.232 Article 62 makes clear that
the doctrine extends to all public lands, including minerals, oil, forest,
parks, animal sanctuaries, and other protected areas; rivers, lakes, and
other water bodies; the seabed on the continental shelf and the
resources in the exclusive economic zone; and all land between the
high and low water marks.233
Thus, the Kenyan public trust doctrine includes both terrestrial and
aquatic resources. Further, article 62 limits the government's ability to
sell or lease the jus publicum in public lands without adequate
justification, stating that "[plublic land shall not be disposed of or
otherwise used except in terms of an Act of Parliament specifying the
nature and terms of that disposal or use."234
ensure ecological sustainable development and use of natural resources." Id.
229 Id. art. 61.
230 Id. art. 69.
231 Id. art. 62.
232 Waweru v. Republic, (2006) 1 K.L.R. 677, 692 (H.C.K.
Nairobi Mar. 2, 2006)
(Kenya), available at http://www.kenyalaw.org/environment/content/search cases_
index.php?SearchTerm2=Water.
233 CONSTITUTION, art. 62 (2010)
(Kenya).
234 Id. art. 62, sec. 4. The High Court of Kenya at Mombasa
has also held that
public roadways are trust property in Niaz Mohamed Jan Mohamad v. Comm'r for
Lands, Civil Suit No. 423 of 1996 (H.C.K. Mombasa Oct. 9, 1996) (Kenya), in UN
COMPENDIUM, supra note 96, at 290, 293 (maintaining that "since the acquisition [of
private land] was done for the purpose of making a Public Road, the road thus made
remained a Public Road or street and vested in the Local Authority ... to hold in trust
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Purposes

The Kenyan public trust doctrine incorporated ecological,
recreational, and other nontraditional uses. Although the 2010
Constitution does not expressly recognize particular public uses, some
provisions indicate that ecological purposes are implicit. For example,
article 69 requires the government to "ensure ...

management and

conservation of the environment and natural resources, and ensure the
Article 68 declares
equitable sharing of the accruing benefits ....
that the parliament must enact legislation "to protect, conserve and
provide access to all public land," 23 6 thus providing a constitutional
guarantee of public access to trust resources.
The Waweru court also elaborated on public trust purposes,
construing the EMCA's promise of a clean and healthy environment
(now entrenched in article 42 of the 2010 Constitution23 7) to
"include [] the access by any person in Kenya to the various public
elements or segments of the environment[] for recreational,
educational, healthy, spiritual and cultural purposes." 38 Because the
High Court determined that the right to a clean and healthy
environment is inherent in the constitutional right to life' 39 and
because the public trust is implicit in the right to life,m the statutory
access purposes are also likely constitutionally entrenched.
d.

Public Standing

The public in Kenya has standing to sue on the basis of the public
trust doctrine, as incorporated in the constitutional right to a clean
and healthy environment. Article 70 of the 2010 constitution specifies
that members of the public may sue if their environmental rights are
"likely to be ... threatened."2 1 1 The constitution expressly states that
for the public in accordance with the law . . . as such trust land, neither the Local
Authority nor the Government could alienate the land. .
235 CONSTITUTION, art. 69 (2010) (Kenya).
236 Id. art. 68.
237 Id. art. 42.
238 See Waweru, (2006) 1 K.L.R. at 688 (citing Environmental Management and
Coordination Act, (1999) Cap. 8 § 3).
239 Id. at 687.
240 Id. at 690.
241 CONSTITUTION, art. 70(1) (2010) (Kenya) ("If a person alleges that a right to a
clean and healthy environment recognized and protected under Article 42 has been, is
being or is likely to be, denied, violated, infringed or threatened, the person may apply
to a court for redress in addition to any other legal remedies that are available in
respect to the same matter.").
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members of the public do not have to demonstrate they have "incurred
loss or suffered injury."242 Therefore, no standing thresholds bar
members of the public from enforcing their constitutionally protected
right to a clean environment.
e.

Remedies

The 2010 Constitution authorizes a variety of remedies for damages
to trust resources or environmental harms. Article 70 provides that
courts may issue both negative and affirmative injunctive relief or may
award compensation "for any victim of a violation of the right to a
clean and healthy environment."24 3 In Waweru, the High Court
employed several remedies to address the water pollution in the
Kiserian River. First, under the public trust doctrine, the Water Act,
and the Local Government Act, the court issued a mandamus
requiring the government and the local county council to construct
and maintain a water treatment facility. 2 " Second, the court prohibited
further residential development in Kiserian Township without
approval of the National Environmental Authority and directed that
authority to employ the precautionary principle when considering any
such approvals because the township lies on the water table. 4 ' The
court also ruled that local authorities should order residents to pay for
the cost of restoration under the polluter pays principle. 2 4 6 However,
the court refused to award attorneys' fees, since the subject of the
litigation was "a matter of public interest." 247
3.

Nigeria: A Constitutionally Implied Public Trust Doctrine

a.

Origins and Basis

The Nigerian public trust doctrine seems implicit in the 1999
Constitution, which declares that "[t]he State shall protect and
improve the environment and safeguard the water, air and land, forest

Id. art. 70(3).
Id. art. 70(2).
244 Waweru, 1 K.L.R. at 692 (citing Local Government Act, (2010) Cap. 265 § 17880; Water Act, (2002) Cap. 372 § 8).
245 Id. at 693.
246 Id.
2
Id. at 696. Compare this reasoning for denying attorney fees with the similar
reasoning of the Uganda High Court in the ACODE decision involving the Butamira
Forest. See supra note 208.
242
243
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and wildlife of Nigeria." 2 48 The Constitution also demands that
"exploitation of human or natural resources in any form whatsoever
for reasons, other than for the good of the community, shall be
prevented . . . ."249 Although lacking express public trust language,
these two provisions arguably impose trust duties on the government
to protect natural resources for the benefit of "the community" - the
beneficiary of the trust. The 1999 Constitution also recognizes the
fundamental right to life," which has been regularly interpreted by
developing countries to include a right to a clean and healthy
environment. 15 Some evidence suggests that the Nigerian judiciary
may also interpret the constitutional right to life to include
environmental health.m
b.

Scope

Since the public trust doctrine is likely to inhere in the 1999
Constitution, its scope is broad, because the constitution considers the
environment, which the state must "protect, improve, and safeguard,"
to include air, water, land, forest, and wildlife resources.2 53 Mineral
resources also seem included.2 54 Since the constitution limits natural
resource exploitation for the "good of the community," 55 the State's
trusteeship probably requires equitable sharing of the benefits of
resource development.

24' CONsTrrunIoN OF NIGERIA (1999),
§ 20, available at http://www.nigerialaw.org/ConstitutionOfTheFederal RepublicOfNigeria.htm.
249 Id. § 17(2)(d).
250 Id. § 33(1).
251 See supra note 105 (India); 127 (Pakistan); note 216 (Kenya); infra
note 263
(South Africa); note 304 (Brazil).
25 See Oluwatoyin Adejonwo-Osho, The Evolution of Human Rights Approaches to
Environmental Protection in Nigeria, IUCN ACADEMY OF INTERNATIONAL LAw, 7 (Aug.
17, 2009), http://www.iucnael.org (discussing the environmental right to life as
applied to gas flaring and suggesting that the Federal High Court's decision in Ghemre
v. Shell Petroleum Dev. Co., [2005] FHC/B/CS/53/05 (unreported) (Nigeria), available
at http://www.climatelaw.org/cases, foreshadows the judiciary's reading into the right
to life an environmental right).
253 CONSTITUTION OF NIGERIA (1999), § 20.
254 See Adejonwo-Osho, supra note 252, at 7; see also CONsTITUTION OF NIGERIA
(1999), H§ 20, 44(3) (declaring public ownership of "minerals, mineral oils, and
natural gas").
255 CONSTITUTION OF NIGERIA (1999), § 17(2)(d).
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Purposes

With no case law, the purposes of the public trust doctrine are not
clear. But, given the likely constitutional entrenchment of an
environmental right, the purposes of the trust most likely includes
protecting, improving, and safeguarding a host of aquatic and
terrestrial resources,256 as well as their equitable distribution.
d.

Public Standing

Under the Nigerian Constitution the Nigerian Supreme Court may
hear appeals "as of right" in cases involving fundamental rights,
including the right to life. 258 However, environmental claims not
implicating the right to life may face standing hurdles, like the special
injury requirement.259
e.

Remedies

The lack of cases makes unclear the remedies available under the
Nigerian public trust doctrine.
4.

South Africa: A Constitutional and Statutory Basis for the Public
Trust Doctrine

a.

Origins and Basis

The public trust doctrine is deeply ingrained in South Africa's
Constitution as well as its statutes. The 1996 Constitution260 laid the
foundation for several statutes enacted between 1998 and 2008 that
reflect trust doctrine principles. 6 Like many developing countries,262
See supra notes 253-54 and accompanying text.
See supra note 255 and accompanying text.
258 CONSTITUTION OF NIGERIA (1999), ch. VII (referencing fundamental rights in
chapter IV, which includes the right to life in section 33).
259 See S. Gozie Ogbodo, The Role of the NigerianJudiciary in Environmental Protection
and Oil Pollution: Is It Active Enough?, NIGERIAN LAw GURU, 4 (Jan. 17, 1980),
http//www.nigerianlawguru.com/articles/environmental%201awlHE%20ROLE%20TH
EOF%The%20NIGERIAN%20JUDICIIARY%201N%20THE%20ENVIRONMENTAL%20
PROTECTION%20AGAINST%2001L%2OPOLLUTION,%20S%201T%20ACTIVE%20E
NOUGH.pdf.
260 S. AFR. CONST., 1996, available at http://www.info.gov.za/documents/constitution/
1996/96cons2.htm.
261 See infra notes 269, 273, 276-79 and accompanying text; see also Takacs, supra
note 98, at 740-47.
262 See supra note 105 (India); note 127 (Pakistan); note 216 (Kenya); note 250
256
257
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the South African Constitution includes the right to life; 263 but the
Constitution goes beyond most in its incorporation of trust language.
For example, section 24 of the bill of rights, which recognizes
environmental rights, declares:
Everyone has the right:
a.

To an environment that is not harmful to their health
or well-being; and

b. To have the environment protected, for the benefit of
present and future generations, through reasonable
legislative and other measures that i.

Prevent pollution and ecological degradation;

ii. Promote conservation; and
iii. Secure ecologically sustainable development and
use of natural resources while promoting
justifiable economic and social development."'
Section 27 further announces that "[elveryone has the right to have
access to . . . sufficient food and water" and requires that "[tihe state
must take responsible legislative and other measures . . . to achieve the

progressive realization of. . . these rights."265 This provision seems to
establish the state's affirmative duty to provide access to food and
water, the latter being part of the traditional corpus of the public trust
doctrine.
Beyond the bill of rights, the South African Constitution imposes
environmental duties on the national and local governments, as well
as the South African Human Rights Commission. Section 146 elevates
national legislation over provincial legislation when "necessary for . . .
the protection of the environment."2 66 Section 152 declares that "[t]he
objects of local government are . . . to promote a safe and healthy

environment" and that "[a] municipality must strive ... to achieve
[these] objects."26 ' Finally, the Human Rights Commission must
annually "require relevant organs of state to provide the Commission
with information on the measures that they have taken towards the

(Nigeria); infra note 304 (Brazil).
263 S. AFR. CONST., 1996, § 11.
264 Id.

§ 24.

id § 27.
266 Id § 146.
267 Id. § 152.
265
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realisation of the rights in the Bill of Rights concerning housing,
health care, food, water, social security, education and the
environment."2 68
In 1998, shortly after the adoption of the 1996 Constitution and one
year after the Indian Supreme Court's M.C. Mehta decision, the South
African legislature enacted two environmental statutes incorporating
the public trust doctrine even more explicitly than the language of the
Constitution: the National Environmental Management Act
("NEMA")2 69 and the National Water Act. 170 NEMA created a
comprehensive environmental lens through which to interpret other
environmental statutes, as discussed below.271 In its statement of
principles, NEMA expressly incorporated the public trust doctrine,
declaring that "[tihe environment is held in public trust for the
people, the beneficial use of environmental resources must serve the
public interest and the environment must protected as the people's
common heritage."m
The National Water Act also devotes considerable attention to the
public trust doctrine.2 73 In its preamble, the Act recognizes that "water
is a natural resource that belongs to all people" and acknowledges that
"the National Government's overall responsibility for and authority
over the nation's water resources and their use, including the equitable
allocation of water for beneficial use, the redistribution of water, and
international water matters ..
7.
Section 3 of the Water Act,
entitled "Public trusteeship of nation's water resources," established
the national government as public trustee which "must ensure that
water is protected, used, developed, conserved, managed and
controlled in a sustainable and equitable manner, for the benefit of all
persons ... while promoting environmental values."275 This language
Id. § 184.
National Environmental Management Act 107 of 1998 ("NEMA") § 2(4)(o) (S.
Afr.), available at http://www.Info.gov.za/view/DownloadFileAction?id=70641.
270 National
Water Act 36 of 1998 § 3(1) (S.Afr.), available at
http://www.info.gov.za/view/DownloadFile Action?id=70693.
2" See generally infra notes 273, 276-79 and accompanying text.
272 NEMA § 4(o).
273 On the Water Act and its origins, which lie in a White Paper written by the
Department of Water Affairs and Forestry, see Robyn Stein, Water Law in a Democratic
South Africa: A Country Case Study Examining the Introduction of a Water Rights System,
83 TEx. L. REv. 2167, 2173 (2004) (discussing Dept. of Water Affairs & Forestry, SA
White Paper on a National Water Policy for South Africa (1997) (S. Afr.), available at
http://www.dwaf.gov.za/Documents/Policies/nwpwp.pdf.
268
269

274

275

National Water Act 36 of 1998 pmbl.
Id. § 3.
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clearly incorporated the public trust doctrine into water management
in South Africa.
Three additional statutes adopt the public trust doctrine. First, the
Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act of 2002
recognized the environmental trust duties imposed by section 24 of
the bill of rights. The Act announced that "the State's obligation to
protect the environment for the benefit of present and future
generation, [while] ensur[ing] ecologically sustainable development of
mineral and petroleum resources . ...

"26

The statute also recognized

mineral and petroleum resources as "the common heritage" of the
people, and the State as the "custodian" of mineral resources, 77
reflecting a sovereign trusteeship. Second, the Biodiversity Act of 2004
established the government's trust duties to "manage, conserve and
sustain" biological diversity, including genetic resources.27 8 Third, the
Coastal Management Act of 2008 contained the most comprehensive
public trust doctrine language, declaring that the government "must
act as the trustee of the coastal zone" and asserting public ownership
of coastal public property, which is inalienable and subject to a right
of public access. 7
b.

Scope

The public trust doctrine in South Africa is expansive. Since section
24 of the bill of rights establishes trust duties in "the environment,"280
the trust doctrine likely encompasses all natural resources. NEMA's
principles establish that "le]nvironmental management must be
integrated, acknowledging that all elements of the environment are
linked and interrelated ..
[,]" " apparently confirming that all
natural resources are subject to trust obligations. Similarly, the
preamble to the Water Act recognizes that "water is a scarce and
unevenly distributed national resource which occurs in many different
forms which are all part of a unitary, inter-dependent cycle . . .

[,]"282

276 Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act
28 of 2002 pmbl. (S. Afr.),
available at http://www.info.gov.za/view/DownloadFileAction?id=68062.
277 Id. §
3.
27' National Environmental Management: Biodiversity Act of 2004
§ 3(a) (S. Afr.),
available at http://info.gov.za/view/DownloadFileAction?id=82171.
27' National Environment Management: Integrated Coastal Management
Act 24 of
2008
H§
11-13
(S. Afr.)
[hereinafter
Coastal Act],
available at
http://www.info.gov.za/view/DownloadFileAction?id=96257.
280 S. AFR. CONST., 1996 § 24.
281
NEMA § 4(b).
282 National Water Act 36 of 1998 pmbl.
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which seems to include all water resources within the corpus of the
trust.
Even if the South African public trust doctrine does not extend to all
natural resources by virtue of section 24 of the bill of rights,
environmental statutes provide an extensive list of resources subject to
trust obligations. NEMA's principles provide that "[slensitive,
vulnerable, highly dynamic or stressed ecosystems, such as coastal
shores, estuaries, wetlands, and similar systems require specific
attention . . . ."284 The Water Act's statement of purposes includes
"protecting aquatic and associated ecosystems and their biological
diversity."28 ' The Mineral Act establishes the state's custodial duties
over "mineral and other petroleum resources. "286
The Biodiversity Act declares the state's duty as trustee, as part of
the environmental rights in section 24 of the Constitution, to
"manage, conserve and sustain South Africa's biodiversity and its
components and genetic resources."2 ' Finally, the Coastal Act
provides an extensive list of "coastal public property" to which the
trust duty attaches, including coastal waters, land submerged by
coastal waters, the seashore, State-owned coastal lands, and any
natural resources on or in coastal property, the exclusive economic
zone, or the continental shelf.288
Thus, the public trust doctrine in South Africa extends to both
traditional and non-traditional resources. The doctrine extends well
beyond tidal waters and shorelands to include sensitive ecosystems,
wetlands, biological diversity and genetic resources, and mineral and
petroleum resources, among a host of expansions beyond the
doctrine's traditional scope.
c.

Purposes

The purposes of the South African public trust doctrine are quite
broad, as indicated by the statutes. Ecological and conservation
purposes are clearly within the doctrine, given the expressed concern
over stressed ecosystems, biological diversity, and genetic resources.8
See supra notes 252, 264 and accompanying text.
NEMA § 4(r).
285 National Water Act § 2(g).
286 Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act
28 of 2002 § 3(1) (S. Afr.),
availableat http://www.info.gov.za/view/DownloadFileAction?id=68062.
" National Environmental Management: Biodiversity Act of 2004 § 3(a) (S. Afr.),
availableat http://www.info.gov.za/acts/2004/alO-04/alO-04a.pdf.
'
Coastal Act 24, supra note 279, at § 7.
NEMA § 3(a) (genetic resources); id. at 4(r) (stressed ecosystems); National
2
28
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NEMA declares that "[e]nvironmental management must place people
and their needs at the forefront of its concern, and serve their physical,
cultural and social interests
developmental,
psychological,
equitably."" The Coastal Act provides "a right of reasonable access to
coastal public property" for the public. 291' The public access right
guaranteed by the Coastal Act should incorporate a number of public
cultural and societal interests, including recreational values related to
water resources.
d.

Public Standing

The South African public trust doctrine is deeply entrenched in the
constitutional environmental right established by section 24 of the bill
of rights. Thus, the public has a constitutional provision of standing
under section 38 of the bill of rights, which grants "anyone" the right
to sue to vindicate a bill of rights provision, including "anyone acting
in the public interest. "292 As section 24's constitutional environmental
rights are expressly incorporated into several statutes, a plaintiff would
seem to be able to bring a suit in the Constitutional Court for statutory
violations. 9 Moreover, the 1996 Constitution also provides in the bill
of rights that "lelveryone has the rights to have any dispute that can
be resolved by the application of that can be resolved by application of
law decided in a fair public hearing before a court or, where
appropriate, another independent and impartial tribunal or forum.2 1
Judicial review of administrative action is also constitutionally
entrenched.295
In addition to these constitutional grants of public standing, the
environmental statutes generally call for public participation and
access to the regulatory process. For example, NEMA declares that
"the participation of all interested and affected parties in
environmental governance must be promoted" in "an open and
transparent manner" with public access to information.2 96 Similarly,
the Water Act recognizes the need for "integrated management" and
Water Act § 2(g) (biological diversity).
290 NEMA § 2(2).
291 Coastal Act 24, supra note 279, at § 13(l)(a).
292 S. AFR. CONST., 1996, § 38(d).
2
The Constitutional Court hears only constitutional claims and claims distinct
from other courts; only the Constitutional Court may decide that parliament or the
president has failed to fulfill its constitutional obligations. Id. § 167.
294 Id. § 34.
295 Id. § 33 (describing a "just administrative hearing").
296 NEMA §
2.
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delegation of management "so as to enable everyone to participate" in
decision making.297 These public participation provisions amplify
South Africa's citizens' environmental rights to include policy
formation in addition to adjudication.
e.

Remedies

As with many developing countries, South Africa incorporates the
"polluter pays" principle into its environmental regulatory regime.
NEMA demands that "[tihe costs of remedying pollution,
environmental degradation and consequent adverse health effects and
of preventing, controlling or minimising further pollution,
environmental damage or adverse health effects must be paid for by
those responsible for harming the environment."2 98 Because NEMA
expressly incorporates notions of environmental trusteeship in the
constitutional environmental right contained in section 24 of the bill
of rights,299 the polluter pays principle, including damages, would
seem to be available under the public trust doctrine. Section 34 of the
constitution declares that in a suit concerning fundamental rights, a
court may "grant appropriate relief, including a declaration of
rights."300 "Appropriate relief" would seem to include both declaratory
and injunction relief, as well as possibly restitution.
C.

The Public Trust Doctrine in South America and North America

1. Brazil: Constitutionally Entrenching the Public Trust Doctrine
a.

Origins and Basis

The public trust doctrine in Brazil is implicit in its 1993
Constitution. 30 Although Brazilian courts have yet to discuss the
public trust doctrine, the principles of sovereign trusteeship,
ecological purposes, public rights, and generational equity are clearly
evident in article 225 of the constitution.30 2 That provision states: "all
persons are entitled to an ecologically balanced environment, which is
an asset for the people's common use and is essential to healthy life, it
being the duty of the Government and of the community to defend
National Water Act 36 of 1998 pmbl.
§ 2(4)(p).
299 S. AFR. CONST., 1996 § 24; see supra notes 265, 279 and accompanying text.
300 S. AFR. CONST., § 38.
301 CONSTITUICAO FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 5 (Braz.).
302 Id. art. 225.
2

2" NEMA
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and preserve it for present and future generations. 301 Moreover, like
other developing nations, the Brazilian Constitution expressly protects
the right to life,304 which article 225 links to an "ecologically balanced
environment," likely establishing that environmental health is also a
fundamental constitutional right.305
Other constitutional provisions indicate that the notion of sovereign
environmental trusteeship is deeply rooted in Brazilian law. Article 20
enumerates the "property of the Union," establishing numerous types
of public property, including sea beaches, ocean and shore lands,
natural resources on the continental shelf and the exclusive economic
zone, territorial waters, tidelands, "hydraulic energy potentials,"
mineral resources, archaeological sites, and "lands traditionally
occupied by Indians." 3 06 Article 23 announces the common duty of all
levels of government to protect the environment and "remarkable
natural scenery," as well as to preserve forests, flora, and fauna.307
Article 24 declares the obligation to the legislative branches of
government to protect the environment, natural resources, and
"natural scenic beauties," and to impose liability for environmental
harms. 30" The 1993 Constitution, therefore, contains a robust list of
trust resources and associated trust duties.
b.

Scope

The Brazilian public trust doctrine is quite broad. The Constitution
declares ownership of both traditional trust property - submerged
lands and tidelands - and also of caves, archaeological sites, mineral
resources, and hydraulic energy sites. 309 Article 225 lists other
resources for which the state has trust duties, including ecological
processes, genetic wealth, flora, and fauna, describing in detail the
"national wealth" of the Amazon Forest, the Atlantic Woodlands, and
the coastline. 310
Id.
Id. art. 5; see supra note 105 (India); note 127 (Pakistan); note 216 (Kenya);
note 250 (Nigeria).
30
See supra note 303 and accompanying text.
306 C.F. art. 20 (including also as property of the Union "unoccupied government
lands indispensable for . . . preservation of the environment, as defined by law").
307 Id. art. 23.
308 Id. art. 24.
301 Id. art. 20; see supra text accompanying note 265.
310 C.F. art. 225 (listing also "Serra do Mar" and the Pantanal Mato Grossense,"
and prohibiting the alienation of "vacant" government lands if "necessary to protect
natural ecosystems").
303

3
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Purposes

The public trust doctrine implicit in the 1993 Brazilian Constitution
seems to encompass a variety of nontraditional uses. Article 24 directs
legislatures to enact laws to protect the environment, provide
pollution control, and protect "historic, cultural, artistic and touristic
monuments, including natural scenic beauties."3 11 Article 225 imposes
a governmental obligation to preserve and restore "an ecologically
balanced environment, which is an asset for the people's common use
and is essential

to a healthy

life . . . for

present

and future

generations."m' To carry out this obligation, the constitution
prescribes preservation and restoration of "essential ecological
processes," genetic resources, fauna and flora, and endangered species,
as well as promotion of environmental education."' Thus, the
expansive purposes of the Brazilian public trust doctrine include not
only ecological but also historic, scenic, genetic, wildlife, and
educative purposes.
d.

Public Standing

If the public trust doctrine and its jus publicum is linked to the
environment and the other purposes mentioned above, the public
seems likely to have standing to sue based on these rights. Article 5 of
the cconstitution stipulates that "any citizen has standing to institute
an action seeking to annul act to the public property or property
pertaining to . . . the environment, and to historical, and cultural

monuments ... the plaintiff shall ... be exempt from court costs and
from the burden of loss of suit . . ..

Citizens also have authority to

sue when the government has violated its constitutional duty to
"defend and preserve [the environment] for present and future
generations." 15
e.

Remedies

In addition to suits to "annul an act" of the government, 316 the 1993
Constitution authorizes injunctive relief, money damages, restitution,

311 Id. art. 24 (calling also for legislation on "forests, hunting, reservation of nature,
defense of the soil and natural resources.
312 Id. art. 225.
313 Id. art. 225(1).
314 Id. art. 5.
315 Id. art. 225.
316 Id. art. 5.

Internationalizingthe Public Trust Doctrine

2012]1

797

and potential criminal penalties for select environmental harms." The
latter would presumably not be available under citizen suits, which
would be reserved for governmental prosecutions.
2.

Ecuador: Establishing the Public Trust Doctrine by Referendum

a.

Origins and Basis

Ecuador's public trust doctrine is fully incorporated into the 2008
Constitution. In a remarkable expansion of environmental protection,
the new constitution recognizes fundamental rights inherent in nature,
giving all persons the right to "call upon public authorities to enforce
the rights of nature."31 Nature, according to the constitution, "has the
right to integral respect for its existence and for the maintenance and
regeneration of its life cycles, structure, functions, and evolutionary
processes." 31 9 Nature also has an express right to restoration, and
individuals have a right to compensation for environmental losses. 32 0
The constitution declares that all "persons, communities, peoples, and
nations shall have the right to benefit from the environment ...
and provides a number of directives to ensure environmental
322
th
protection. Thus, the central elements of the public trust doctrine fiduciary duties over natural resources, vested in the sovereign for the
benefit of the people, and enforceable by the people - seem clearly
embedded in the 2008 Constitution.
In addition to the rights of nature, the Ecuador constitution protects
human environmental rights, establishing the "right of the population
317 See id. art. 225(2) (mineral developers subject to restoration requirements); id.
art. 225(3) (those who harm the environment subject to criminal sanctions).
318 CONSTITUcION POLITICA DE 2008 [CP]
art. 71 (Ecuador), available at
http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Constitutions/Ecuador/english08.html.
319
320 Id. art. 72 ("Nature has the right to be restored. This restoration right shall be
apart from the obligation of the State and natural persons or legal entities to
compensate individuals and communities that depend on affected natural systems

321 Id. art. 74.
32 Id. art. 72 ("In those cases of severe or permanent environmental impact,
including those caused by the exploitation of nonrenewable natural resources, the
State shall establish the most effective mechanisms to achieve the restoration and shall
adopt adequate measures to eliminate or mitigate harmful environmental
consequences"); id. art. 73 ("The State shall apply preventive and restrictive measures
on activities that might lead to the extinction of species, the destruction of ecosystems
and the permanent alternation of natural cycles . . . "); id. art. 74. ("The State shall
give incentives to natural persons and legal entities and to communities to protect
nature and promote respect for all elements comprising an ecosystem.").
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to live in a healthy and ecologically balanced environment" and
declaring that environmental protection is a matter of public
interest. 3 23 There is also a fundamental "human right to water," which
2
is alienable only as a "strategic asset for use by the public. "1
Although not express, the fiduciary duties of the State are evident
throughout the constitution. For example, one provision announces
that among the State's "prime duties" is the protection of "the
country's natural and cultural assets."3 25 Another declares that all
Ecuadorians have "duties and obligations" to "defend the territorial
integrity of Ecuador and its natural resources[,]" and to "respect the
rights of nature, preserve a healthy environment and use natural
resources rationally, sustainably and durably."32 1
b.

Scope

A vast number of resources are subject to the Ecuadorian public
trust doctrine. All water is likely subject to the public trust, as one
constitutional provision declares that the "human right to water is
essential and cannot be waived. Water constitutes a national strategic
asset for use by the public and it is inalienable, not subject to the
statute of limitations, immune from seizure and essential for life." 327
Access to beaches and riverbeds and other water bodies is always
constitutionally guaranteed. 2
But the scope of the public trust doctrine extends considerably
beyond water and waterways, seemingly including all natural
resources. The constitution refers to "unique and priceless assets of
Ecuador, includ[ing] the physical, biological and geological
formations whose value from the environmental, scientific, cultural, or
landscape standpoint requires protection, conservation, recovery and
promotion." 329 Nonrenewable natural resources, mineral resources,
biodiversity and genetic resources, and even "the radio spectrum" are
"the inalienable property of the State ...."330 The State has a duty to
protect "the domain of fragile and threatened ecosystems,
including ... high Andean moorlands, wetlands, cloud forests, dry
and wet tropical forests and mangroves, marine ecosystems and
323
324
325
326
327
311
329
330

Id. art. 14.
Id. art. 12.
Id. art. 3.
Id. art. 83(3), (6).
Id. art. 12.
Id. art. 375(8).
Id. art. 404.
Id. art. 408.
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seashore systems."33 It seems as if virtually all natural resources have
an attached fiduciary obligation.
c.

Purposes

The Ecuadorian public trust doctrine includes biodiversity, ecology,
and probably scenic and recreational purposes. The constitution
declares that all people "shall have the right to benefit from the
environment and the natural wealth, enabling them to enjoy the good
way of living." 3 2 In pursuit of this goal, the constitution provides a
"right of the population to live in a healthy and ecologically balanced
environment

that

guarantees

sustainability . . ..

Environmental

conservation, the protection of ecosystems, biodiversity and the
integrity of the country's genetic assets, the prevention of
environmental damage, and the recovery of degraded natural spaces
are declared matters of public interest."333 The constitution expressly
directs the State to "exercise sovereignty over biodiversity, whose
administration and management shall be conducted on the basis of
"1334
responsibility between generations ....
Although recreation is not an express purpose, the constitution
protects the right to "habitat and housing," for which the State must
"guarantee and protect public access to the beaches of the sea and the
banks of rivers, lakes, streams, and ponds, and the existence of
perpendicular access ways." 3 35 Since access to waterways is often for
recreation and fishing, it seems likely that recreation is an implicit
purpose of the Ecuadorian public trust doctrine. Similarly, the
constitution also protects "unique and priceless natural assets[,]"
which are valuable from a "landscape standpoint,"3 36 implying that
natural and scenic beauty is a trust purpose.
d.

Public Standing

The public has constitutional standing to enforce the Ecuadorian
public trust doctrine. Because nature has inherent, publicly
31
332

Id. art. 406.
Id. art. 74. The "good way of living" is referred to as the "sumak kawsay." Id.

pmbl.
33 Id. art. 14; see also id. art. 399 ("The full exercise of state guardianship over the
environment and joint responsibility of the citizenry for its conservation shall be
articulated by means of a decentralized national environmental management system,
which shall be in charge of defending the environment and nature.").
3
Id. art. 400.
. Id. art. 375(8).
31
Id. art. 404.
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enforceable rights,337 laill persons, communities, peoples, and
nations can call upon public authorities to enforce the rights of
nature," including "fil[ing] legal proceedings and resort[ing] to
judicial and administrative bodies without detriment to their direct
interest . . . ."' Thus, plaintiffs pursuing environmental claims need
not show individual harm. The constitution also eliminates any statute
of limitation for environmental harm,3 " imposes the burden of proof
on the operator of the activity,3 41 and expressly endorses the

precautionary principle. 34 2
The constitution is unequivocal about the public's ability to enforce
constitutional rights, making them "directly and immediately
enforceable by and before any civil, administrative, or judicial
servant . .. at the request of the party." 43 Constitutional rights are
"fully actionable," with no statutory or regulatory preconditions, and
"[aibsence of a regulatory framework cannot be alleged to justify their
infringement or ignorance thereof, to dismiss proceedings filed as a
result of these actions or to deny their recognition. 3
e.

Remedies

Remedies for violations of the Ecuadorian public trust doctrine are
comprehensive, including injunctions, restitution, money damages,
and mitigation. Since the constitution adopts the precautionary
it also endorses "preventative measures ... for the
principle,
purpose of avoiding or ceasing the violation or threat of violation of a
right." 346 Restitution and compensation for environmental harms are
also constitutionally authorized, including "the obligation of integrally
restoring the ecosystems and compensating affected persons and
communities."34 ' But since "[njature has the right to be restored," this
right is distinct and "apart from the obligation of the State and natural

13

3
3o
31
342

Id. arts. 71-74.
Id. art. 71.
Id. art. 397.
Id. arts. 1, 396.
Id. art. 397(1).

3

Id.
Id. art. 11(3).

3+

Id.

3

Id. art. 397(1).

346

Id. art. 87.
Id. art. 396.
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persons or legal entities to compensate individuals and communities
that depend on affected natural systems."348
Damages to trust resources place affirmative duties on both the
government and private actors. The constitution implicitly adopts the
concept of vicarious liability, stating that "[elach one of the players in
the processes of production, distribution, marketing, and use of goods
or services shall accept direct responsibility for preventing any
environmental impact, for mitigating and repairing the damages
caused, and for maintaining an ongoing environmental monitoring
system.""'9 Private parties, therefore, not only have a duty to provide
restitution, but also to mitigate future harms. 3 0 The State has an
obligation to enforce against private parties causing environmental
harm, as well as against public servants responsible for environmental
monitoring. 5
3.

Canada: Authorizing Suits for Public Damages and Against
Government Inaction

a.

Origins and Basis

The public trust doctrine in Canada has roots in public access
disputes, cases based on claims of public nuisance for obstructions to
navigable waters and public highways, and sometimes, on dedications
by grant or prescription. More recent case law has expressly discussed
the public trust doctrine, although without fixing the doctrine's place
in Canadian law.
The oldest Canadian decisions address public access rights to
navigable waters. In the 1866 case Attorney-General v. Harrison, " the
chancery court held that despite a Crown license, a sawmill's
discharge of debris was a public nuisance because it interfered with

348

Id. art. 72.

Id. art. 396.
The state also has a duty to "adopt adequate measures to eliminate or mitigate
harmful environmental consequences." Id. art. 72.
.

30

"

Id. art. 397.

Att'y Gen. v. Harrison (1866), 12 Gr. 466 (Ct. Ch. Upper Can.) (all ensuing
pinpoint citations will be to Westlaw paragraph assignments). For an in-depth
analysis of the Canadian public trust doctrine, see the following works, all by Andrew
Gage: Highways, Parks and the Public Trust Doctrine, 18 J. ENVTL. L. & PRAc. 1 (2007);
Public Rights and the Lost Principle of Statutory Interpretation, 15 J. ENVTL L. & PRAc.
107 (2005); and Public Environmental Rights: A New Paradigmfor Environmental Law?,
CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC. Soc'Y OF B.C. 1 (2007), http://wcel.org/resources/
publication/public-environmental-rights-new-paradigm-environmental-law.
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navigation.353 Interpreting the concept of navigability broadly,3 54 the
court declared that a license to operate a sawmill cannot be construed
to include the right to commit a public nuisance or to interfere with
public rights.5 In short, the court determined that the Crown could
not abdicate the jus publicum in navigable waters, and that years of
public acquiescence did not justify maintenance of a public
nuisance. 5
Some years later, in Rhodes v. Perusse,"' the Supreme Court of
Canada rejected a riparian landowner's right to exclude the public
from a beach adjacent to the tidally influenced St. Lawrence River
under theories of dedication or prescription. 5 ' Despite possessing a
Crown grant, Rhodes had no right to exclude the public from the
beach because, at the time of the grant, the public had free access to
and from the river from a highway that ran along the shorelands.*
The court determined that the beach had been dedicated to the public
both from the text of the grant and by implication."* Even if the grant
had contained no dedication to the public, the court would have
concluded that the public had prescriptive rights to use the beach.361
.. Harrison, 12 Gr. 466 para. 3.
35 Id. para. 6 ("In a new country, especially, no narrow interpretation should be
put upon the word 'navigable.' To do so would be to exclude from public use rivers
and harbors highly valuable for purposes of commerce and of safety.").
355 Id. para. 9 ("[Tlhe Crown cannot grant a license to commit a public nuisance. It
would be licensing an individual to do that which interferes with a right which is the
common inheritance of the people . . . such a license is not to be implied: it would be
derogating from the honor of the Crown to assume an intention to do that which
would be injurious to the people; and it would be assuming ignorance on the part of
the Crown of its own powers and of the rights of the subject.").
356 Id. para. 7 ("No length of time will legitimize a public nuisance, the soil being
in the Crown, and the user the common inheritance of the public at large."). However,
the chancery court did indicate that public rights could depend on whether the
waterway way natural or artificial. Id. para. 9.
3
Rhodes v. Perusse, [19081 41 S.C.R. 264 (Can.).
358 Id. para. 18.
1
See id. para. 3.
360 Id. paras. 5-6. The court discussed the limits on the Crown's ability to abdicate
its trust duties concerning the jus publicum in the shorelands, stating "[t]he Crown, as
owner of the foreshore, had undoubtedly the right to cut it up and dispose of it as
deemed best; but clearly in so doing it owed a duty to the general public, irrespective
of the special rights of the riparian owners, to protect them in the enjoyment of the
common law right of acces et sortie to the river which they then had and of which they
must necessarily be deprived in the contingency then foreseen that the beach might be
laid out for building lots. It is not to be assumed that the Crown would be more
solicitous for the private interests of certain individuals than for the common law
rights of the general public . . . ." Id. para. 6.
61 Id. para. 13 (concluding that over 30 years of public use was sufficient to perfect
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As early as the 1930s, Canadian courts began incorporating notions
of trusteeship in public access decisions. For example, in Vancouver v.
Burchill, 6
the Canadian Supreme Court determined that
municipalities were fee simple owners of streets in a case involving the
applicability of a motor vehicle licensing statute to a claim of damages
for negligent vehicular homicide.36 3 But the court cautioned that
"[municipalities] are not, however, owners in the full sense of the
word . . . hold[ing] [las a trustee for the public."3
The Canadian Supreme Court reaffirmed the limits on Crown
ownership in Friends of the Oldman River Society v. Canada, a 1992
case involving whether a rule issued by the Minister of Environment
complied with the Navigable Waters Protection Act. 36 5 After noting
that public navigation rights exist regardless of whether a waterway is
tidal,366 the Court declared that the right of navigation "is paramount
to the rights of the owner of the [river] bed, even when the owner is
the Crown." 6' Thus, no Crown grant is sufficient to abdicate the jus
publicum in navigable waters without clear legislation.
At least three more recent decisions have explicitly endorsed public
trust principles. First, in 1997, in Labroador Inuit Ass'n v.
Newfoundland, the Newfoundland Court of Appeal, reviewed a
government decision to exempt a mining project from environmental
assessment requirements and indicated that trust principles would
inform its review of the implementation of environmental
legislation. 369 Endorsing protection of future generations, as well as
the precautionary principle, the court stated:
If the rights of future generation to the protection of the
present integrity of the natural world are to be taken seriously,
and not to be regarded as mere empty rhetoric, care must be
taken in the interpretation and application of legislation.
a prescriptive right).
362 [19321 S.C.R. 620 (Can.).
363 Id. para. 22.
364 Id. The court noted that legislation can abridge the common law
right of public
access to public highways only through express words or clear intent. Id. para. 17.
365 Friends of the Oldman River Soc'y v. Can. (Minister of Transp.), [1992] 1
S.C.R. 3, para. 8 (Can.).
366 Id. para. 76 (observing that "the distinction between tidal and non-tidal waters
was abandoned long ago," and citing In re Provincial Fisheries, 11896] 26 S.C.R. 444
(Can.)).
367 Id. para. 77 (citing Flewelling v. Johnson, [19211 59 D.L.R.
419 (Can.)).
368 Id. para. 78 (citing R. v. Fisher, [1891] 2 Ex. C.R. 365 (Can.)).
36' Labrador Inuit Ass'n v. Nfld. (Minister of Env't and Labour), [19971 155 Nfld.
& P.E.I.R. 93 (Can.).
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Environmental laws must be construed against their
commitment to future generations and against a recognition
that, in addressing environmental issues, we often have
imperfect knowledge as to the potential impact of activities on
the environment.370
The Court of Appeal then overturned the trial division's determination
in favor of the Minister of Environment and Labour and required
environmental assessment of the ancillary mining works.
Second, the Canadian Supreme Court in 2004 showed a willingness
to apply the public trust doctrine in a case involving the alleged
negligence of a Crown licensee for a forest fire. In British Columbia v.
Canadian Forest Products, Ltd. (CanFor),72 the Crown sued for
damages both in its capacity as landowner and as representative of the
public interest. 73 Although it only awarded damages for the former,
the court discussed both sorts of damages, referring to the Institutes of
Justinian, English common law, and the French civil code, which
recognized "common property in navigable rivers and streams,
beaches, ports, and harbours."" The court also discussed the
evolution of the public trust doctrine in the United States. 7 ' Although
the court did not rule on the Crown's public trust standing because it
was not fully argued on appeal, the decision indicated that there was
"no barrier to the Crown suing" for damages as well as injunctive
relief.37 6
Third, a Prince Edward Island trial court in 2005 refused to dismiss
a claim of breach of public trust in a case involving the Minister of
Fisheries and Oceans alleging a breach of fiduciary duty to maintain
Id. para. 11.
Id. paras. 28 (noting the decision of the Trial Division); id. para. 80 (Court of
Appeal's judgment requiring an environmental assessment).
372 British Columbia v. Canadian Forest Prods., Ltd. (CanFor), [2004] 2 S.C.R. 74,
para. 1 (Can.).
3
Id. para. 46. The issue in the case was the precise calculation of damages the
Crown could receive: whether "stumpage value" or "auction value of the harvestable
trees." Id. at para. 46. CanFor argued that since the "Crown has framed this case as an
ordinary commercial law suit," damages should be calculated in the "ordinary way."
Id. at para. 61. The trial division determined that since the trees were not going to
market, the auction value was "out of accord with commercial reality," thus refusing
the public interest claim. Id. at para. 54.
3
Id. paras. 74-75.
37 Id. paras. 78-80 (discussing interstate public nuisance cases and environmental
enforcement cases as well as public trust cases like Illinois Central).
376 Id. para. 81. The court expressed some reservation over "the important and
novel policy positions raised" by a public trust suit by the Crown. Id.
370

371
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the common right to fish in Atlantic fisheries." Relying in part on the
Canadian Supreme Court's CanFordecision, the court explained that if
a government can sue:
as guardian of the public interest, to claim against a party
causing damage to that public interest, then it would seem in
another case, a beneficiary of the public interest ought to be
able to claim against the government for a failure to properly
protect the public interest . . [because] [a] right gives a
corresponding duty."
b.

Scope

The public trust doctrine in Canada encompasses traditional trust
resources, but suggests likely expansion to upland resources.
Navigable waters are clearly public highways for commerce and
fishing.37 9 Moreover, a century ago in Rhodes v. Perusse, the Canadian
Supreme Court extended public access rights to a privately owned
beach. 8 o The Crown or municipalities also generally hold public
highways in trust."
In its 2004 CanFordecision, the Canadian Supreme Court suggested
it was open to entertaining public trust suits for damage to forests and
the environment generally. The court recognized that "Itihe notion
that there are public rights in the environment that reside in the
Crown has deep roots in the common law." 38 2 The court also adopted
a 1979 decision by the Ontario Court of Appeal, stating, "in our
judgment, the municipality is, in a broad general sense, a trustee of the
environment for the benefit of the residents in the area."" Thus, the
3"
Prince Edward Island v. Can. (Minister of Fisheries & Oceans), 12005] 256
Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 343, para. 6 (Can.).
378 Id. para. 37. The court reserved judgment on the merits, requiring the plaintiffs
to amend their pleadings to avoid political questions. Id. para. 42.
37
See, e.g., Friends of the Oldman River Soc'y v. Canada (Minister of Transp.),
[19921 1 S.C.R. 3, paras. 75-78 (Can.) (discussing common law rights of navigation
and limits on the Crown's ability to interfere with these rights); Prince Edward Island,
256 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. para. 6 (refusing to strike a public trust claim for mismanaging
Atlantic fisheries); Harrison, 12 Gr. 466 para. 3 (determining that debris from a
sawmill which interfered with public navigation was a public nuisance).
380 Rhodes v. Perusse, [1908] 1908 CarswellQue 96 para. 6, 41 S.C.R. 264 (Can.)
(protecting public beach access along the St. Lawrence River, despite a Crown grant to
private landowners).
31 Vancouver v. Burchill, [19321 S.C.R. 620, para. 22 (Can.) (declaring that
municipalities hold public access rights to public streets in trust for the public).
382 CanFor,2 S.C.R. 74 para. 74.
383 Id. para. 73 (quoting Scarborough v. R.F.F. Homes, Ltd.
(1979), 9 M.P.L.R. 255,
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Canadian public trust doctrine may extend to all natural resources to
which the Crown or municipalities have fiduciary duties.
c.

Purposes

The Canadian public trust doctrine is limited primarily to traditional
trust purposes, particularly public access for navigation, fishing, and
commerce. Although decided primarily on public nuisance grounds,
the Chancery Court of Upper Canada enjoined a sawmill operator
from discharging debris and provided an environmental purpose
because not only was "the navigation ... impeded, but fish, which
used formerly to frequent the harbor, have now disappeared, and their
disappearances attributed by witnesses to the saw-dust deposit."8
Trust principles also apply to protect free access to public highways.3 8
d.

Public Standing

The Canadian public's ability to enforce against infringement of
trust resource is limited by nuisance and other tort law principles.
Traditionally, only the Attorney General could bring a public nuisance
claim, unless an individual could prove special injury, meaning injury
different in kind from that experienced by the general public, rather
than a difference in degree. 8 In recent years, however, Canadian
courts have suggested that standing rules may be broadening. In its
CanFordecision, the Canadian Supreme Court ruled that the Attorney
General had a right to sue for damages on the public's behalf, stating
that the Crown's standing should not be narrowly interpreted because
the Crown has "inalienable 'public rights' in the environment and
certain common resources." 87 A year later, in Labroador Inuit Ass'n, a
Prince Edward Island trial court relied on CanFor to conclude that if
the Crown has standing to sue to vindicate the public interest, the
public should have standing to sue the government when it fails to
adequately protect the public interest, since a "right gives rise to a
corresponding duty."3 8

257 (Can. Ont. C.A.)).
384 Harrison, 12 Gr. 466 para. 1.
385 See, e.g., Burchil, [1932] S.C.R. paras. 17, 22 (Can.).
386 See, e.g., Stein v. Gonzales, [1984] 58 B.C.L.R. 110, para. 6 (Can.).
387 CanFor, 2 S.C.R. para. 76.
388 See, e.g., Prince Edward Island v. Canada (Minister of Fisheries & Oceans),
[20051 256 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 343, 2005 CarswellPEI 78, para. 34-37 (Can.).
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Remedies

Canadian courts have limited remedies for infringement of trust
resources to injunctive relief, largely because most cases have involved
public access rights.'8" But in its CanFor decision, the Canadian
Supreme Court stated that "there is no legal barrier to the Crown
suing for compensation as well as injunctive relief .... ." Thus, it
appears that the Crown may recover money damages, in addition to
injunctive relief, for infringement of trust resources. However, it is less
clear whether the public may seek money damages if the government
does not. Although the Labroador Inuit Ass'n court suggested that a
public trust claim could lie against the Crown for failing to protect
trust resources, that case involved only declaratory relief, not money
damages.9
CONCLUSION
This review reveals how the public trust doctrine in twelve different
countries across four continents has evolved into a doctrine of
ecological protection in ways unrealized in the United States. Abroad,
the doctrine also incorporates the principles of precaution, sustainable
development, and intergeneration equity in the process. This linkage
is often due to courts' interpretation of the doctrine as a part of
constitutional and statutory declarations of the public's right to a
healthy environment or the right to life. In the United States,
constitutional and statutory declarations of the public trust doctrine
have been largely unrecognized.
Internationally, the public trust doctrine also applies to many more
natural resources, both aquatic and terrestrial, as Professor Sax
suggested it should over four decades ago. In most of the countries
examined in this article, the public trust doctrine has equipped the
public with broad standing to challenge government and private
proposals that threaten the trust's environmental and public access
purposes. Conversely, some American states have erected
impediments to public trust suits, requiring legislative permission to
challenge administrative action, personal injury, and sometimes even
injury different in kind from that suffered by the general public. Far
from imposing standing impediments, courts outside the United States
See, e.g., Harrison, 12 Gr. 466 para. 10.
CanFor,2 S.C.R. para. 81.
39 Compare Prince Edward Island, 256 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. para. 1, with Labrador Inuit
Ass'n v. Nfld. (Minister of Env't & Labour), [19971 155 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 93, para. 81
(Can.).
389
390
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have often invited litigants to pursue public trust claims, sometimes
even based on newspaper investigations, and often providing original
jurisdiction in the country's supreme court. Non-U.S. courts have also
used the public trust doctrine to fashion complex remedial
injunctions, epitomized by the Philippines Supreme Court's order to
clean up Manila Bay, which one justice of that Court referred to as a
"perpetual mandamus." 39 2
The basis of the public trust doctrine abroad is also distinctive. Unlike
the common law origins in most American states, the doctrine in the
countries examined in this Article reveals an origin that is sometimes
statutory and often constitutional. The doctrine is also of natural law
based in countries like India and the Philippines, the two nations whose
courts have given the most sustained consideration to the public trust.
A natural law origin of the trust doctrine would insulate it from
statutory or constitutional change. However, statutory or constitutional
attempts to eliminate the public trust doctrine seem unlikely in the early
twenty-first century, as countries like Ecuador rush to adopt the
doctrine by initiative. The public trust doctrine seems quite popular
today beyond the borders of the United States, a development which
Professor Sax may have envisioned - but which he did not explicitly
predict - in his foundational Article many years ago.
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See supra note 183 and accompanying text.

